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Abstract
The paper moves from a discussion of the challenges posed by the crisis to standard macroeconomics
and the solutions adopted within the DSGE community. Although several recent improvements have
enhanced the realism of standard models, we argue that major drawbacks still undermine their reli-
ability. In particular, DSGE models still fail to recognize the complex adaptive nature of economic
systems, and the implications of money endogeneity. The paper argues that a coherent and exhaus-
tive representation of the inter-linkages between the real and financial sides of the economy should
be a pivotal feature of every macroeconomic model and proposes a macroeconomic framework based
on the combination of the Agent Based and Stock Flow Consistent approaches. The papers aims
at contributing to the nascent AB-SFC literature under two fundamental respects: first, we develop
a fully-decentralized AB-SFC model with several innovative features, and we thoroughly validate it
in order to check whether the model is a good candidate for policy analysis applications. Results
suggest that the properties of the model match many empirical regularities, ranking among the best
performers in the related literature, and that these properties are robust across different parameteri-
zations. Second, the paper has also a methodological purpose in that we try to provide a set or rules
and tools to build, calibrate, validate, and display AB-SFC models.
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1 Is the economic crisis a crisis for Macroeconomics?
More than eight years since the onset of the global financial crisis we are still assessing how the crisis should
change our view about macroeconomics. The crisis cast serious doubts on the plausibility of standard
macroeconomic models - in particular of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models - and
their ability to provide effective policy advices to prevent the occurrence of large-scale economic turmoils,
and to tackle their consequences.
In a nutshell, the anatomy of the standard DSGE model presents an economy composed of different
types of representative agents, such as households and firms, maximizing in a infinite lifetime horizon
an objective function subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint. The first order conditions yield
a fully state-contingent plan for the representative agents choice variables (e.g consumption/saving and
hours dedicated to work/leisure for the consumer) looking forward from the planning date into the
foreseeable future, depending on agents’ expectations. Rational expectations are assumed, implying that
representative agents know the “true model” of the economy, thereby having an optimal plan in response
to exogenous shocks that may buffet the economy.1
To reduce the computational burden, models are usually solved using log-linearization, allowing to
approximate a system of nonlinear equations into a system which is linear in terms of the log-deviations
from steady state values of the associated variables (see Zietz, 2008).
One of the strongest criticisms risen against this framework in the aftermath of the crisis was cen-
tered on its alleged inability to deal with non-linearities characterizing real world behaviors and economic
dynamics. In particular, the common practice of using log-linearization around the steady state forcibly
imposed a stability condition on the system which eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibria, sud-
den state transitions, and tipping-point phenomena (Rubio-Ramirez and Fernandez-Villaverde, 2004).2
Furthermore, since the quality of the log-linearized approximation deteriorates as we move away from the
steady state (Amisano and Tristani, 2007; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), this hinders its efficacy in
assessing the consequences of big shocks.
In response to these limitations, several DSGE models started to incorporate different types of non-
linearities in their models, while an increasing number of contributors has adopted non-linear solution
methods (see Borogan Aruoba et al. (2006) for a review of these methods): non-gaussian shocks (An-
dreasen et al., 2013), “smooth” non-linearities (Borogan Aruoba et al., 2013) based on curved and asym-
metric decision rules, and “piecewise” non-linearities arising from kinks in decision rules (e.g. zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates) are some of the expedient adopted in the recent literature. However,
efforts to take the lesson of the crisis on board have mainly gone in the direction of including in the
models a financial sector and “financial frictions” Brunnermeier et al. (2012) in the wake of the seminal
contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Formally, financial fric-
tions emerge when trade in certain assets cannot take place because markets are incomplete. This may
happen because there is no market at all for certain state-contingent assets, or because parties are not
willing to engage in certain contracts because of agency problems, arising from limited enforcement power
or information asymmetries (Quadrini, 2011). In both cases, agents are unable to anticipate/postpone
spending (for consumption or investment), or insure against uncertain events (to smooth consumption or
investment), thus being unable to enforce their optimal state-contingent plan.
The bulk of DSGE models dealing with financial frictions typically focus on some credit constraint,
limiting the amount of debt financing on the base of borrowers’ collateral value, or equity constraint
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014).Financial frictions can limit the flow of funds among agents, in par-
ticular towards productive “expert” agents who must borrow to pursue their investment plans. An initial
small shock to expert agents’ net worth can be amplified through endogenous feed-backs if productive
agents are forced to fire-sell their capital thus triggering a vicious loop between drops in assets prices and
drops in collateral value, which feed instability.
There is no doubt that modern DSGE models are far more complex that usually thought and that the
literature on financial frictions has greatly improved their ability to mimic non-linearities and to account
for episodes of financial fragility. Nonetheless, we feel that this stream of literature is still affected by
major drawbacks which, if not sufficient to argue in favor of a complete demise of DSGE models, justify
1Although this framework was common to both RBC and New Keynesian DSGE models, the latter diverge in ad-
mitting that prices may not immediately adjust to clear the market, due to market imperfections (i.e. prices rigidities
and monopolistic competition) and information asymmetries, possibly leading to market failures and sub-optimal social
configurations.
2Indeed, a by-product of the log-linearization approximation of a DSGE model is that, whenever a shock hit with an
additive random disturbance, the system behaves in either a strong stabilizing manner or in a totally explosive way. The
common practice then suggested to simply rule out the unstable paths from the linearized model.
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the quest for alternative approaches to macroeconomic modeling.
On the one hand, the new remedies do not solve, nor address, many of the old pathologies plaguing the
DSGE literature: the “olympic rationality” assumption underlying rational expectations; the reduction
of agent’ behaviors’ to a problem of inter-temporal optimization based on technology and idle homoth-
etic preferences (Simon, 1976); the flaws in the empirical and theoretical definition of the CES utility
function and the Cobb-Douglas production function (Shaikh, 1974); the restrictive hypothesis applied
to preferences and technology in order to find an internal solution to the agents’ optimization problem.
These are some of the unresolved issues undermining the very foundation of DSGE models. All in all, the
representative agent approach at the base of DSGE models is still inherently affected by the “fallacy of
composition” in taking that what is true for individual agents must also be valid for the whole economic
system (Delli Gatti et al., 2010a).
Even apart from these criticisms, there is another fundamental reason to depart from the DSGE
literature: though being now able to mimic non-linear dynamics, DSGE models still rely on external
shocks to explain the origin of those non-linearities. Admittedly, financial frictions DSGE models still
fail to understand the inherent nature of finance and money (Werner, 2014, 2015). Most of these models
either assume that banks are totally absent and all lending is direct, or adopt the loanable funds approach
which reduces the role of financial institutions to mere intermediaries, accepting deposits of pre-existing
real resources from savers and lending them to borrowers. In reality banks do not intermediate, but
rather create additional means of payment ex-novo by granting loans to non-bank customers. Every new
loan recorded on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet is immediately offset by a matching liability
in the form of a new deposit, so that the loan creation process corresponds to an expansion of the bank’s
balance sheet.
Important consequences derive from this economic fact. First, since financing allows investment
projects to be carried out, the national account identity between investment and savings implies that
lending is a pre-condition for savings, rather than a consequence. Second, as long as banks are free to
create claims which are universally accepted as means of payment, their credit creation potential does
not find any upper bound in the amount of savings available in the economy. In financial frictions
DSGEs, the monetary side of the economy is fully determined in the real sphere and savings need
time to be accumulated through the production of additional goods. In reality, banks can create money
instantaneously by expanding their balance sheet, the only limit being represented by their own assessment
of the implications of new lending for their profitability and solvency. In practice, neglecting this aspect
prevents to understand the causes of financial instability and induces to dramatically underestimate its
consequences.3
Besides neglecting the endogenous nature of inside money, modern DSGE models are also deficient
in understanding the nature and functioning of outside money. This aspect has drawn less attention
also among critics of standard macroeconomics. Standard DSGE models assume that the stock of legal
money circulating in the economy is either fixed and pre-existent, or postulate that the monetary authority
exogenously sets the growth rate of real money balances. No explanation is given of the actual channels
by which this additional money is injected into the system, and distributed across agents. In most cases
it is simply assumed that seigniorage from this activity is redistributed in a lump sum fashion to the
consumers through real money transfers.
In reality, legal money is injected into the economy through two fundamental channels. The first one
is represented by cash advances granted on demand by the Central Bank to banks, at the Central Bank
policy rate. Since banks’ demand for cash advances is determined in relation to the stock of deposits
they hold, this channel fundamentally reflects the endogenous dynamics of loans and (matching) deposits.
The second channel is related to fiscal policy and arises from government’s payments and transfers to
the private sector. These do not only increase the deposit of the receiving agent, but also (and in equal
measure) the reserves of the bank holding the deposit.
Conversely, legal money is destroyed whenever a private sector agent makes a payment to the gov-
ernment forcing their deposit bank to transfer a portion of her legal reserves to the government.Reserves
(or legal money) must be already available when making these payments suggesting that government
spending must logically come before government financing, and not the other way round as postulated
by standard macroeconomics, for a similar reason to why bank lending is a pre-condition to allow private
agents to hold their savings in the form of liquid assets.
This economic fact also implies an important macroeconomic identity: in a closed economy, leaving
3An eminent exceptions is Benes et al. (2014) presenting a prototype model in which endogenous money is embedded
within an otherwise standard DSGE model. A comparison with similar loanable funds DSGE models shows that the latter
systematically underestimate the effects of exogenous shocks on bank lending, and thereby economic activity.
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aside Central Bank lending in the form of cash advances, the amount of legal reserves and paper money
held in the private sector should be exactly equal to the amount of government bonds purchased by the
Central Bank4. Failing to understand this point may thus lead to unreasonable and logically inconsistent
conclusions, in particular when dealing with fiscal and macro-prudential policies.5
The arguments just proposed, while motivating our departure from the DSGE literature, also stresses
that a proper representation of the financial system and of the process by which inside and outside money
are created, injected, and destroyed should be a key ingredient of every macroeconomic model. In particu-
lar, our reasoning highlights the inter-relatedness of private and public agents’ balance sheets, as decisions
undertaken by individual agents always affect other agents, both directly and indirectly through a bal-
ance sheet channel. This interrelatedness in turn must be reflected in given macroeconomic accounting
identities which affect the structure and outcomes of the economy. Every macroeconomic model should
then in principle provide a complete and coherent accounting system, based on i)a realistic modeling of
sectors’ or individual agents’ balance sheets (according to the degree of disaggregation adopted), and ii)
a consistent tracking of the financial-real transactions undertaken by agents and of flows of real-financial
stocks they subtend.
Our contribution goes in this direction by proposing a prototype model based on the combination of
two modeling approaches: the Agent Based (Farmer and Foley, 2009; Esptein, 2006) approach, which con-
ceives the economy as a complex adaptive system populated by heterogeneous locally interacting agents,
and the Stock Flow Consistent framework (Godley and Lavoie, 2007), which provides a comprehensive
and fully integrated representation of the real and financial sides of the economy through the adoption
of rigorous accounting rules based on the quadruple entry principle developed by Copeland (1949).
In the next section we briefly discuss the literature on which our contribution builds in order to
highlight the advantages and the drawbacks of the two approaches taken in isolation, and to outline the
main contributions of our work. In particular, our paper has two fundamental objectives. On the one
hand we provides a fully decentralized AB-SFC model in which accounting consistency is implemented
at very bottom level in order to give account of structural interrelatedness of agents’ balance sheet. The
structure of the economy depicted (section 2) is kept simple and flexible enough to be progressively
augmented under several directions (e.g. household debt, technological progress, stock markets), but
general enough to be employed for policy analysis. In order to assess whether the model represents a
good candidate for conducting policy analysis, the paper focuses on the model validation by comparing
the properties of our artificial time series with several macroeconomic and microeconomic stylized facts
found in the empirical literature (section 5).
Finally, we perform several sensitivity experiments (section 5.3) to check the robustness of the prop-
erties displayed by the model. Although this analysis is carried out by performing a parameter sweep
on agents’ heuristics, rather than by imposing a policy shock in the steady state as usual in the DSGE
and AB macroeconomic literature, our results have some policy relevance confirming the topicality of the
arguments in favor of a proper modeling of inside and outside money: the endogenous nature of money
implies that banks, instead of being limited by the availability of real money balances mirroring real
output growth (as usual in DSGE models), have huge margins of discretion in determining the amount of
credit so that monetary means of payment exceeding the current value of real output is the norm, rather
than a special case; as a consequence, even when real output is bounded by limited resources and fixed
technical coefficients and even within the same institutional framework, changes in the risk aversion of
banks may result in periods of excess credit affecting both the transition dynamics and the long term
properties of the economy.
In addition to this, the paper has also a fundamental methodological purpose in that it aims at setting
a set of replicable and general rules to build, calibrate, and validate (internally and externally) AB-SFC
models building upon the best practices proposed in the AB and SFC literature, while discussing new
recipes designed to address AB-SFC specific issues, in particular regarding the calibration procedure.
4The reader can easily verify the validity of this claim by looking at table 1 in the appendix
5In particular, this rises several concerns about the implications for public debt sustainability and financial sector
resilience of the claim for Central Banks independence which have become a cornerstone of neoclassical macroeconomics.
These claims have gone up to the point of inhibiting Central Bank’s purchases of government debt on the primary market.
In our alternative perspective, government spending financed via Central Bank purchases of bonds exerts the by-product of
providing safe and cheap liquid assets to financial operators, which can be used as a buffer stock to face unexpected losses
during period of financial and economic instability.
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1.1 An Agent Based-Stock Flow Consistent Framework
During the seventies, Godley and Cripps (1983) and his collaborators at the Cambridge Economics Policy
Group started developing their models inspired by the macro identity approaches of Kalecki, Minsky and
Tobin. Their so-called “flows of funds” approach aimed at providing a comprehensive and fully integrated
representation of the economy, including all financial transactions and changes in the money supply. Using
flow of funds accounts to analyze the US economy at the turn of the century, Godley and Wray (1999);
Godley and Zezza (2006) pointed out that growing households’ indebtedness was pushing assets’ inflation
and leavening systemic risk under the surface of the alleged stability of the early ’00s, thereby anticipating
the crisis with significant precision regarding the timing and mechanics of the collapse. In 2011, the Bank
of England used a flow-of-funds approach to analyze the mechanics of financial instability. Barwell
and Burrows (2011) advocated the diffusion of macroeconomic approaches that stress the importance of
balance sheet linkages in spotting buildups of financial fragility.
Stock Flow Consistent (SFC hereafter) models, stemming from Godley’s earlier work, aim at re-
sponding to this call (Godley, 1997; Godley and Lavoie, 2007). This approach employs specific social
accounting matrices to ensure that every flow of payments comes from somewhere and goes somewhere
and that every financial stocks is recorded as a liability for someone and an asset for someone, so that
there are no financial black holes in the model.6
This feature brings some important advantages to SFC models. First, it makes SFC models a perfectly
suited tool for modeling endogenous and government money. Second, the fully integrated structure
underlying the accounting matrices gives account for the interrelatedness of agents’ balance sheet. Third,
the logic underlying SFC models and the construction of their accounting matrix is totally coherent with
the structure of national accounts. Several countries have complete flow-of-funds accounts or financial
flows accounts, as well as national balance sheet accounts, thus opening the possibility of a full estimation
of SFC models.
Finally and most importantly, a major advantage in employing a SFC framework is that it provides
a fundamental check of the model logical consistency. As a consequence, Stock Flow Consistency should
be a property of every macroeconomic model. Whenever violated, this implies that some agent or sector
in the model is building a stock of financial assets or liabilities which do not find a liability or asset
counterpart. These financial stocks have been originated and may give rise to transactions or financial
flows which should not have occurred if the model had a consistent logic. These new flows in turn can
amplify the magnitude of inconsistencies, leading to unreasonable evolutions of agents’ balance sheets,
and greatly undermining the reliability of model results.
Conversely, Caiani et al. (2014) and Kinsella (2011) outlined some drawbacks affecting the SFC litera-
ture. Traditional SFC models are highly aggregated, dividing the economy in major institutional sectors,
typically households, banks, firms, and the public sector.7 This perspective abstracts from tracking
intra-sectoral flows and does not allow to analyze the causes and effects of agents’ heterogeneity emerging
within and across sectors. This limit definitively hinders, and in some cases impedes, the possibility of
studying phenomena which are deeply connected to agents’ heterogeneity and agents’ disperse interaction,
such as selection and self-organization processes within markets or industries, the generation of financial
bubbles, and the propagation of shocks through network-based balance sheet relationships.
In this respect, Agent Based models, geared around the conception of the economy as a complex
adaptive system, may greatly help to overcome many of these limitations. Contributions in this field
highlight how even the simplest microeconomic behaviors may lead to complex systemic properties due
to feedbacks, externalities, and other structural effects arising from agents disperse interactions. Agent
Based models have proven to be well-suited to explain the emergence of financial fragility. Much attention
has been devoted to the impact exerted on business cycles by credit conditions and firms’ finance, in a
context of incomplete asymmetric information and imperfect financial markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1993). Good examples of this field of research are Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2008, 2010b) who focused
on the role of commercial and banks’ credit networks topology in spreading financial fragility through
contagion effects, Cincotti et al. (2010), who investigates the link between business cycles and monetary
aggregates, and Raberto et al. (2012) who focuses on regulatory capital requirement to analyze debt
dynamics and business cycles.
Over recent years, several authors have advocated increasing investment in agent-based modeling
in response to the crisis (Farmer and Foley, 2009; Colander et al., 2009). Empirically, agent based
6“The fact that money stocks and flows must satisfy accounting equalities in individual budgets and in an economy as
a whole provides a fundamental law of macroeconomics analogous to the principle of conservation of energy in physics.”
(Godley and Cripps, 1983, p.14).
7See Caverzasi and Godin (2015) for a recent survey of the SFC literature.
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macroeconomic models have proven to be capable of reproducing a significant number of micro and
macroeconomic stylized facts (see, for example, Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2015; Delli Gatti et al., 2008;
Assenza et al., 2015; Riccetti et al., 2014), often outperforming DSGE models (Fagiolo and Roventini,
2012). Our feeling is that AB models may greatly benefit from an integration with the SFC accounting
framework having the potential to set an alternative paradigm to economic modeling, as advocated by
Farmer and Foley (2009); Delli Gatti et al. (2010a).
A trivial reason to argue in favor of an SFC implementation of AB models is that most AB models, not
dissimilarly from standard models, are not SFC. An example of inconsistency is represented by the exit-
entry process of firms, where it is usually assumed that new firms enter the market to replace defaulted
ones with a given stock of capital and liquid assets . The question then arises of where does this additional
capital come from and whom is providing this additional liquidity. Since these stocks seem to appear
ex-nihilo rather than be realized through a transfer of resources, this assumption is implicitly imposing
an exogenous positive shock on the model dynamics which counteracts the negative endogenous shock
related to the firm’s default. Not less important, while the creation of additional capital does not affect the
balance sheet of other agents (since there is no liability holder for real assets), the newly created deposits
should be recorded as a new liability for banks which is not matched by an inflow of other financial
assets (such as reserves, as it would be if the deposits of the new firm were obtained from a transfer
of liquid resources by some other agent), thereby imposing an unjustified additional negative shock on
their balance sheet. This implies that the aggregate balance sheet and transaction flow matrices of the
economy no longer satisfy the quadruple-entry principle. Apart from the accounting inconsistency, this
fact is likely to affect the patterns of consumption, investment, savings, credit, and other macroeconomic
variables in an extent difficult to evaluate: banks holding new deposits may be forced to ask more cash
advances to the Central Bank in order to restore mandatory liquidity ratios, newly created deposits will
be used for paying wages and to fund investment, while bringing a flow of interests to the new firm;
conversely, deposits that should have been transferred by some incumbent agents to fund the creation of
the new firm remain at their disposal, and can be used to determine and fund expenses for consumption
and investment. Agents will pay taxes on the income and profits generated by these expenses. Small
accounting inconsistencies so tend to build up over the simulation, rather than being absorbed, leading
to logically incoherent flows and stocks evolutions.
Most of these inconsistencies derive from a flaw definition of the exchange of financial stocks underlying
each transaction. For example, it is not unusual to find that firms’ demand for external funds is determined
as a residual between planned expenses (e.g. wages, interests, investment) and the firm’s net-worth. In
some other cases, banks are assumed to buy government bonds using their net-worth, or some related
measure. In both examples, the fact that an agent have positive, possibly high, net-worth does not imply
in any way that he will also have the liquid assets required to clear the transaction. A firm for example
may have a great stock of real capital while having low deposits. Similarly banks may have high loans
while having low reserves.
These examples allow us to rise a fundamental point motivating our contribution: although there
is no doubt that empirical validation of the model properties should be a necessary condition, this
is not sufficient per se. Checking the logical and accounting consistency of the structure generating
those properties should be as well a crucial component of the overall model validation process. For this
sake, every model should provide a clear-cut description of the financial assets involved in every type of
transaction taking place in the simulated economy.
Our contribution hence distinguishes itself from other papers in the related literature under several
respects. First, although AB modelers has recently started to move towards fully consistent models and a
few attempts to develop AB-SFC models now exist in the literature (Kinsella et al., 2011; Riccetti et al.,
2014; Seppecher, 2012), these contributions are highly heterogeneous both in terms of the economic
issues addressed and of the solutions adopted to implement stock flow consistency. This restricts the
replicability of these solutions and makes it difficult to compare them and to assess the actual consistency
of the models. The diffusion of the nascent AB-SFC literature is currently hampered by the lack of a
well-defined set of concepts, rules and tools to develop and validate these models. Our paper thus aims
at giving a contribution in this direction by outlining what should be the key ingredients of an AB-SFC
paper, and by proposing some solutions to specific challenges posed by the methodology, in particular
regarding the calibration and accounting validation of these models.
Second and related to this, the paper implements an AB-SFC model from the very bottom layer,
that is starting from an explicit representation of individual agents’ balance sheets and decentralized
transactions. To our knowledge, the economic literature provides just one other example of AB model
sharing this feature: the EURACE model (see Deissenberg et al., 2008; Cincotti et al., 2010; Raberto
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et al., 2012; Dawid et al., 2012, 2014; van der Hoog and Dawid, 2015), a massively large-scale economic
model of the EU economy first developed in 2006 and now implementing many hyper-realistic features
such as day-by-day interactions, geographical space, and a huge variety of agents, including international
statistical offices. Although our work shows several points of convergence with the philosophy of the
EURACE project, our objective is different and somehow complementary.
Despite the success of EURACE as a tool for policymakers, its complexity limits by a significant
degree the accessibility and re-usability by other scholars making difficult for the general audience of
economists to enter the logic of the model, let alone master the skill required to manage it, and adapt
it for new purposes. Furthermore, running such a large model necessitates the use of massively parallel
computing clusters, which are not generally available to all scholars. Our objective differs in that we
do not want to move towards a one-to-one matching of real economies, but rather we aim to develop a
relatively simple and flexible AB-SFC model which can be easily employed, adapted, and changed, thus
serving as a benchmark for other scholars who want to get involved in this approach.
Third, while the model can be replicated in different programming languages, its original implemen-
tation was realized using our brand new Java Macro Agent Based (JMAB) programming tool suite,
explicitly designed for AB-SFC models. The platform exploits the logic of the object-oriented program-
ming paradigm to provide a flexible and highly modular computational framework embedding general
procedures to ensure and check the model stock-flow consistency at the macro, meso and micro levels. It
has the potential to implement a wide variety of models and a number of crucial features of modern eco-
nomic systems, in particular regarding the handling of heterogeneous real and financial stocks in agents’
balance sheets (see for example section 3.2) and the representation of commercial and financial networks.
The platform has been released under Beta-version and it is freely available on-line with introductive
documentations explaining its structure and giving an overview of its main classes.8
Fourth, the validation of the model (section 5) has been subdivided into two components, in line
with the arguments proposed: accounting validation, in which we propose two intuitive methods to check
for the effective accounting coherence of the model, based on macroeconomic identities; and empirical
validation in which we combine the best-practices available in the literature focusing on the model ability
to replicate relevant macro and micro stylized facts emerging from the empirical literature.
Fifth, the paper proposes an innovative method to solve the problem of calibrating initial values
of stocks and flows in an SFC manner (section 4), as well as several other parameters of the model.
Calibration is widely recognized as one of the most tricky stages of simulation-based approaches to
macroeconomics. Surprisingly, while very sophisticated techniques have been proposed for the calibration
of behavioral parameters, the literature has paid almost no attention to the task of calibrating initial
stock and flow values. Admittedly, almost no AB macroeconomic model provides a detailed discussion
of the logic followed to determine initial values of stocks and flows. In the AB-SFC approach, this task
is made even more difficult by the fact that, in order to avoid to prejudice the model with the types of
logical bias discussed above, the values of stocks and flows should be compatible since the beginning.
Furthermore, as the model is conceived as an approximation of reality, the relative sizes of these stocks
should be set at reasonable levels. Given that AB models usually require a ‘burn-in’ period, agents should
be endowed with sufficiently high buffer stocks (e.g. capital, deposits, reserves) to face possible strange
or extreme dynamics originated in this phase, possibly inducing the economy to snawball. Achieving
these three results together is not trivial. In particular, since models usually do not have the variety of
real and financial stocks observed in reality, the need to accomplish mutual coherence between stocks
values significantly circumscribes the leeway to achieve the other two conditions. In an AB perspective,
calibration should also specify how these values are distributed among agents, and then, how the age,
time to maturity, original and outstanding values of each specific stock in the balance sheet of agents is
determined. Finally, calibration shall also define how the balance sheets of agents are initially connected,
that is for each financial asset held by an agent (e.g. a loan for a bank) we have to identify who is the
liability counterpart (the borrower for that specific loan).
The last two aspects of the calibration procedure are also connected to a sixth aspect which distin-
guishes our model from other contribution in the literature. Most macroeconomic AB models (Delli Gatti
et al. (2010a); Riccetti et al. (2013, 2014); Dosi et al. (2012) and later works with the Schumpeter+Keynes
model) still assume that loans are granted at the beginning of the period and repaid at the end of the
period. This hypothesis prevents to grasp the inherent discrepancy between the short-termism of banks
liabilities (i.e. demand deposits) and the typical long-termism of banks’ assets (i.e. loans) whose rele-
vance dramatically emerges during credit crisis. Most of the credit risk that lenders bear originates from
this temporal dimension of credit. Our model instead assume that loans have a duration of 20 periods
8The platform, the installation guide, and related documentation can be found at: https://github.com/S120/jmab.
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and are progressively repaid following a constant-share amortization schedule. In addition, the model
features multiple banks and allows firms to fall into debt with different banks through endogenous credit
market interactions, rather than imposing a single loan with a single bank (as for example in Riccetti
et al. (2014); Delli Gatti et al. (2010a); Dosi et al. (2012) or multiple loans with a single ‘giant’ bank (as
in Assenza et al. (2015))9. Besides allowing the model to replicate several stylized facts related to the
distribution of credit between firms and banks (see section 5), there are other good theoretical reasons
for having multiple banks, as banks’ flexibility in creating money through loans should be limited by the
need to remain profitable in a competitive banking system.10
In addition, the model presents a fully disaggregated-fully decentralized economy in which all trans-
actions between private agents occur through local interactions based on matching protocols, rather than
aggregating some sector (as for example in Seppecher, 2012; Assenza et al., 2015), or assuming repli-
cator equations as usual in the evolutionary literature (see for example [and later works]Saviotti and
Pyka (2004); Verspagen (2002); Dosi et al. (2010)). This allows not only to analyze the microeconomic
distributions of several important variables, but to generate them as an emergent properties of agents’
disperse interaction rather than the reflection of a behavioral assumption.
Finally, the model also presents several aspects on novelty in the definition of agents’ heuristics, in
particular related to firms’ investment and funding behavior, banks’ interest and lending (and rationing)
strategies, and the management of firms’ and banks bankruptcies. To avoid repetitions,we postpone the
discussion of these aspects to the dedicated sections.
2 The model
Figure 1: Flow Diagram of the model. Arrows point from paying sectors to receiving sectors.
The economy described by the flow diagram of figure 1 is composed of:
• A collection ΦH of households selling their labor to firms in exchange for wages, consuming and
saving in the form of banks’ deposits. Households own firms and banks proportionally to their
wealth, and receive a share of firms’ and banks’ profits as dividends. Unemployed workers receive
a dole from the government. Finally, households pay taxes on their gross income.
9The main reason for these simplifying assumptions is not to be found on the theoretical level, but rather in the technical
difficulties to handle the multiplicity of heterogeneous loans characterized by different age, different interest rates, different
liability and asset holders, etc. JMAB effectively overcomes these difficulties by exploiting the opportunities of Object
Oriented Programming.
10To our knowledge, the only model sharing these features is the Eurace/Eurace− UniBi model (Raberto et al., 2012;
van der Hoog and Dawid, 2015)
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• Two collections of firms: consumption (ΦC) and capital (ΦK) firms. Consumption firms produce
a homogeneous consumption good using labor and capital goods manufactured by capital firms.
Capital firms produce a homogeneous capital good characterized by the binary {µk, lk}, indicating
respectively the capital productivity and the capital-labor ratio. Firms may apply for loans to
banks in order to finance production and investment. Retained profits are held in the form of
banks’ deposits.
• A collection ΦB of banks, collecting deposits from households and firms, granting loans to firms,
and buying bonds issued by the Government. Mandatory capital and liquidity ratios constraints
apply. Banks may ask for cash advances to the Central Bank in order to restore the mandatory
liquidity ratio.
• A Government sector, which hires public workers (a constant share of the workforce) and pay
unemployment benefits to households. The government holds an account at the Central Bank,
collects taxes, and issues bonds to cover its deficits.
• A Central Bank, which issues legal currency, holds banks’ reserve accounts and the government
account, accommodates banks’ demand for cash advances at a fixed discount rate, and possibly buy
government bonds which have not been purchased by banks.
During each period of the simulation agents interact on five markets:
• A consumption goods market: households interact with consumption firms;
• A capital goods market: consumption firms interacts with capital firms;
• A labor market: households interact with government and both types of firms;
• A credit market: firms interact with banks;
• A deposit market: households and firms interact with banks.
Following Riccetti et al. (2014), we explicitly model agents’ dispersed interactions by assuming that
agents on the demand and supply sides of each market interact through a common matching protocol.
In each period of the simulation, ‘demand’ agents are allowed to observe the prices or the interest rates
charged by a random subset (whose size depends on a parameter χ reflecting the degree of imperfect
information). Agents’ switch from the old partner to the best potential partner selected in this random
subset with a probability Prs which is defined, following Delli Gatti et al. (2010a), as a non-linear
(decreasing when the price/interest represents a disbursement for the demander, increasing otherwise)
function of the percentage difference in their prices pold and pnew. The shape of this function is governed
by the ‘intensity of choice’ parameter ǫ > 0: higher values of ǫ > 0 imply a higher probability of
switching.11
In some cases, some suppliers exhaust inventories available for sale, possibly leaving some customers
with a positive residual demand. We then allow demand agents to look for other suppliers within the
original random subset of potential partners in order to fulfill it. Markets interactions are ‘closed’ when
demand agents have fulfilled their demand, when there are no supply agents willing or able to satisfy
their demand, or if demanders run out of deposits to pay for demanded goods.
Agents’ interactions generates several types of economic transactions and financial transfers. As
argued before, a clear-cut description of the types of real and financial flows taking place in the model, is
a key aspect for assessing the accounting and logical consistency of a model. Hence, we classify the flows
arising in the model as follows:
Deposit transfers: If agents involved hold their deposits at the same bank, payer’s deposit is
decreased and receiver’s increased. Otherwise, also a reserve transfer for the same amount from the
payer’s bank to the receiver’s bank takes place. The same occurs when an agent decides to move its
deposits to a new bank.
Dividends and deposits interests: Firms pay dividends through via deposit transfers. Interests
on deposits are paid by simply increasing customers’ deposits by the required amount. The same occurs
for dividends, when the receiver holds a deposit at the paying bank. Otherwise, also a reserve transfer
for the dividend amount from the paying bank to the receiver’s bank takes place.
11A detailed description of all model equations can be found at: http : //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid =
2664125
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Private workers’ wages: wages of private workers by firms are paid via a deposit transfer, as
explained above.
Public servants’ wages and dole: public workers’ wages and unemployment benefits give rise
to the same type of transfers. The receiver’s deposit is increased while reserves are subtracted to the
government account at the Central Bank and transferred to the receiver’s bank.
Taxes: firms’ and households pay taxes using their deposits. Accordingly, the payer’s bank transfers
reserves for the same amount to the government account at the Central Bank. Banks pay taxes by
transferring reserves to the government account at the Central Bank.
Purchase of real goods: transactions in real goods are cleared via a deposit transfer. Contextually,
also real goods motivating the transaction are transferred from the seller’s to the buyer’s asset side.
Purchases of bonds, repayment, and interests: Bonds are a liability for the government and an
asset for banks and the Central Bank. Central Bank’s purchases increases its liabilities (i.e. reserves, that
is legal money) while also increasing the government account at the Central Bank. Interests on bonds
are immediately re-distributed to the government. Commercial banks purchases of bonds are cleared
via a transfer of reserves from banks to the government current account at the Central Bank. Bonds
repayments and bonds interest payments give rise to the opposite flows.
Loans creation, repayment, and interests: Loans and matching deposits are created endoge-
nously and ex-nihilo as explained above. Interest payments and principal repayments (reducing the stock
of loans) give rise to the same type of transfers. If borrower’s deposit bank coincides with the lending
bank, the payment is realized by lowering the borrower’s deposit. If the the borrower’s moved his deposits
to another bank, also a corresponding reserves transfer from the borrower’s bank to the lending bank
takes place.
Cash advances creation, repayment, and interests: Cash advances are a loan extended by the
Central Bank to commercial banks which is matched by a temporary increase of banks’ reserves (a liability
for the Central Bank). Conversely, cash advances repayments extinguished the loan while reducing
commercial banks’ reserve accordingly. Interest payments give rise to the same type of transfer, reducing
private banks’ reserves. Interests on cash advances are distributed to the government by increasing its
deposit account at the Central Bank.
Table 2 in appendix B shows how this micro flows build up in shaping the Transaction Flow Matrix of
the overall economy (data refer to the initial set-up of the simulation). The upper section of the matrix
displays flows taking place during a period of the simulation, while the bottom section shows how this
flows determine the variation of financial assets, thus providing a full integration between the Transaction
Flow Matrix and the Balance Sheet matrix of the economy displayed in table 1. Stock Flow Consistency
implies, as explained in Godley and Lavoie (2007), that the rows and columns of the Transaction Flow
Matrix sum to 0.12
2.1 Sequence of events
In each period of the simulation, the following sequence of events takes place:
1. Production planning: consumption and capital firms compute their desired output level.
2. Firms’ labor demand : firms evaluate the number of workers needed to produce.
3. Prices, interest, and Wages : consumption and capital firms set the price of their output; banks
determine the interest rate on loans and deposits. Workers adaptively revise their reservation wages.
4. Investment in capital accumulation: consumption firms’ determine their desired rate of capacity
growth and, as a consequence, their real demand for capital goods.
5. Capital good market (1): consumption firms choose their capital supplier.
6. Credit demand : Firms assess their demand for credit and select the lending bank.
7. Credit supply: Banks evaluate loan requests and supply credit accordingly.
8. Labor market : unemployed workers interact with firms on the labor market.
9. Production: capital and consumption firms produce their output.
10. Capital goods market (2): consumption firms purchase capital from their supplier. New machiner-
ies are employed in the production process starting from the next period.
11. Consumption goods market : households interact with consumption firms and consume.
12The table also displays two types of flows, the change in inventories nominal value and capital amortization, which are
not treated above as they do not correspond to any actual exchange of real or financial resources between agents. Both
however enters in the accounting definition of profits (which is employed in the determination of taxes and dividends).
Notice that this implies that profits, in accordance with reality and contrary to most models where the variation of firms’
deposits is assumed equal to net-profits, do not coincide with firms’ operating cash flows (see section 3.1.3)
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12. Interest, bonds and loans repayment : firms pay interests on loans and repay a (constant) share of
each loan principal. The government repays bonds and interest to bonds’ holders. Banks pay interest on
deposits. Cash advances and related interests, when present, are repaid.
13. Wages and dole: wages are paid. Unemployed workers receive a dole from the government.
14. Taxes : taxes on profits and income are paid to the government.
15. Dividends : dividends are distributed to households.
16. Deposit market interaction: households an firms select their deposit bank.
17. Bond purchases : banks and the Central Bank purchase newly issued bonds.
18. Cash Advances : the Central Bank accommodates cash advances requests by private banks.
In each period of the simulation, firms may default when they run out of liquidity to pay wages or to
honor the debt service while banks default if their net wealth turns negative. The effects of firms’ and
banks’ defaults are treated in section 3.3.
3 Agent behaviors
This section details the behavior of each type of agents. We used the following notation in the equations.
Consumption firms variables have a c subscript, capital firms a k, households a h and banks a b. If the
variable is identical for consumption and capital firms, we used the x subscript. All agents share the same
simple adaptive scheme to compute expectations (indicated by a e superscript) for a generic variable z:
zet = z
e
t−1 + λ(zt−1 − z
e
t−1) (3.1)
3.1 Firm behavior
3.1.1 Production planning and labor demand
Firm x desired output in period t (yDxt) depends on the firm’s sales expectations s
e
xt. We assume firms want
to hold a certain amount of real inventories, expressed as a share ν of expected sales, as a buffer against
unexpected demand swings (Steindl, 1952) and to avoid frustrating customers with supply constraints
(Lavoie, 1992).
yDxt = s
e
xt(1 + ν)− invxt−1 with x = {c, k} (3.2)
Firms in the capital-good industry produce their output out of labor only. Capital firms’ demand for
workers depends on yDkt and the labor productivity µN , which we assume to be constant and exogenous.
NDkt = y
D
kt/µN (3.3)
The labor requirement of any consumption firm c can be calculated as:
NDct = u
D
ct
kct
lk
. (3.4)
where kct indicates the real stock of capital, lk is the constant capital-labor ratio, and u
D
ct is the rate of
capacity utilization needed to produce the desired level of output yDct , given by:
uDct = Min(1,
yDct
kctµK
), , (3.5)
where µK indicates (fixed) capital productivity.
Workers in excess, when present, are randomly sampled from the pool of firm employees and fired.
We also assume a positive employee turnover, expressed as a share ϑ of firm’s employees.
3.1.2 Pricing
Prices of goods are set as a non-negative markup muxt over expected unit labor costs:
pxt = (1 +muxt)
W extN
D
xt
yDxt
, (3.6)
where W ext is the expected average wage.
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The mark up is endogenously revised from period to period following a simple adaptive rule. When
firms end up having more inventories than desired (see section 3.1.1), the markup is lowered in the next
period, in order to increase the attractiveness of their output.
muxt =
{
muxt−1(1 + FN) if
invxt−1
sit−1
≤ ν
muxt−1(1− FN) if
invxt−1
sit−1
> ν,
(3.7)
where FN is a random number picked from a Folded Normal distribution with parameters (µFN , σ
2
FN ).
3.1.3 Firms’ profits
Consumption firms’ pre-tax profits are the sum of revenues from sales, interest received, and the nominal
variation of inventories,13 minus wages, interest paid on loans, and capital amortization:
πct = sctpct + i
d
bt−1Dct−1 + (invctucct − invct−1ucct−1) . . .
. . .−
∑
n∈Nct
wnt −
t−1∑
j=t−η
iljLcj
η − [(t− 1)− j]
η
−
∑
k∈Kct−1
(kkpk)
1
κ
(3.8)
where idbt−1 is the interest rate on past period deposit Dct−1 held at bank b, ucc are unit costs of
production, wnt is the wage paid to worker n, i
l
j is the interest rate on loan Lcj obtained in period
j = t− η, ..., t− 1, pk is the price paid for the batch of capital goods kk belonging to the firm’s collection
of capital goods Kct−1, and η = κ are the duration of loans and capital respectively. Capital firms’ profits
only differ in that they do not display capital amortization.
This accounting definition of profits is then used to compute the amount of taxes firms have to pay:
Txt = Max {τpiπxt, 0}, τpi being the corporate profits tax rate. Dividends are then computed as a constant
share ρx of firm’s after-tax profits: Divxt = Max {0, ρxπxt(1− τpi)}.
We also consider an alternative measure of firms’ performance in order to capture the actual ability
of the firm to generate cash inflows through its normal business operation.We define the ‘operating cash
flow’ OCFxt as after-tax profits plus capital amortization costs (for consumption firms), minus changes
inventories and principal repayments.
Operating cash flow can be interpreted as a sort of ‘Minskian’ litmus paper: an OCF ≥ 0 implies
that the firm is capable of enough generating cash flow to honor the debt service (hedge position). If
the OCF is negative, but its absolute value is less than or equal to the principal repayment, the firm is
in a speculative position since its cash flows are sufficient to cover the interest due, but the firm must
roll over part or all of its debt. Finally, when the OCF is negative and its absolute value is greater than
principal payments, the firm is trapped in a Ponzi position.
3.1.4 Investment
Firms invest in each period in order to attain a desired productive capacity rate of growth gDct depending
on the desired rate of capacity utilization uDct and the past period rate of return, defined as in equation
3.10.
gDct = γ1
rct−1 − r
r
+ γ2
uDct − u
u
(3.9)
rct =
OCFct∑
k∈Kct−1
(kkpk)(1 − agekt−1
κ
)
. (3.10)
Here, u and r denote firms’ ‘normal’ rates of capacity utilization14 and profit respectively, both
assumed to be constant and equal across firms. The denominator in equation 3.10 expresses the previous
period value of the firm’s stock of capital, with agekt−1 indicating the age in period t− 1 of the batch of
capital goods k belonging to the collection Kct of firm c.
13In accordance with standard accounting rules, firms’ inventories are evaluated at the firms’ current unit cost of produc-
tion.
14A Empirical evidence shows that firms normally display excess capacity, aiming for normal rates of utilization ranging
in the 80-90% range (Eichner, 1976). Steindl (1952) and Lavoie (1992) suggest that firms plan some excess capacity in order
to avoid to constrain demand in case of large growth in demand; Spence (1977) argues that excess capacity is employed by
incumbent firms as a deterrent to entry by new firms. For a detailed discussion about empirical and theoretical contributions
on excess capacity see Lavoie (2015).
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Given gDct , we can derive the real demand for capital goods i
D
ct as the number of capital units required
to replace the obsolete capital15, and to fill the gap between current and desired productive capacity level.
Once firms have chosen their capital good suppliers, nominal desired investment IDct can be computed by
multiplying iDct for the price pkt applied by the selected supplier k.
3.1.5 Firms’ finance
Since Fazzari et al. (1988), more and more empirical evidence contradicting the Modigliani and Miller
(1958). Solid arguments have been provided in favor of a pecking order theory of finance (Meyers, 1984):
in the presence of imperfections in capital markets (e.g. information asymmetries), the cost of external
finance (equity emissions and loans) is usually high. Firms then resort to external financing when internal
funding possibilities have been completely exhausted. However, evidence shows that firms almost never
arrive to the point of exhausting all their internal resources before asking for credit. We therefore assume
that firms desire to hold a certain amount of deposits, expressed as a share σ of the expected wages
disbursement, for precautionary reasons. The demand for credit by consumption firms is then:
LDct = I
D
ct +Div
e
ct + σW
e
ctN
D
ct −OCF
e
ct (3.11)
where Divect is the expected dividends disbursement (based on expected profits). Credit demand function
for capital firms can be derived from equation (3.11) by omitting ID.
3.1.6 Labor, Goods and Deposit markets
After the credit market interaction between banks and firms has taken place, firms interact with unem-
ployed households on the labor market. Production then takes place. Firms’ output can be constrained
by the scarcity of available workers (i.e. full employment case) or by productive capacity constraints.
Households and consumption firms then interact on the consumption good market and households
consume. Consumption firms buy capital goods previously ordered (see section 3.1.4) which will be
employed in next periods.
Finally, gross profits πxt are computed, taxes Txt are paid, and dividends Divxt distributed to house-
holds (see section 3.4).
3.2 Bank behavior
As explained in the introduction, our model features an endogenously evolving credit network with firms
interacting with several banks on the credit market during each round of the simulation, selecting the
best partner and possibly obtaining multi-periodal loans.16 As a consequence, firms will generally have
a collection of heterogeneous loans with different banks. Firms’ possibility to obtain a loan depend
on the credit rationing mechanism employed by banks to evaluate loans request. In the earliest AB
macroeconomic literature, banks were assumed to accommodate loan requests by borrowers, eventually
discriminating borrowers only through interest rates. In reality banks mainly discriminate through credit
rationing rather than interest rates (see Jakab and Kumh, 2014, for a survey of empirical literature) while
the empirical evidence suggests that credit is a more important driver of real activity than the price of
credit (Waters, 2013).
Recently, AB models has started to introduce some credit rationing mechanisms. Riccetti et al. (2014)
assume banks sets an upper bound to loans that can be grant to single borrowers, expressed as a share of
total loans. Dosi et al. (2013) assume a maximum level of credit as a multiple of deposits, badly ranked
firms may thus result credit constrained if better ranked ones exhaust it. Similarly, van der Hoog and
Dawid (2015) and Raberto et al. (2012) assume banks are willing to accommodates loan requests as long
as their outstanding credit is compatible with capital requirements. Assenza et al. (2015) instead assume
banks have a maximum admissible loss on each loan which is employed to determine an upper bound to
borrowers’ credit, based on their estimated probability of default.
Our contribution aims to push further this frontier by introducing a novel quantity rationing mecha-
nism which explicitly takes into account both the risk and the expected internal rate of return associated
to each credit application. A second point of departure is that, in evaluating borrowers’ credit worthiness,
15For sake of realism, we assume that the financial value of each capital batch is lowered by a constant share (1/κ) of the
original purchasing value in each period, while the correspondent real stock of machinery can be used at full potential till
it reaches age = κ
16Loans last for η = 20 periods (i.e. 5 years) and are repaid following the same amortization scheme: in each period firms
repay a constant share (1/η) of the original amount.
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banks do not employ a stock measure, such as the leverage ratio. Instead, they look at the applicant’s
operating cash flows, which provides (as explained in section 3.1.3) a more effective measure of the firm’s
ability to generate cash inflows to honor past and future debt commitments. Banks’ credit supply in the
model is so based on the following three pillars:
• Active management of banks’ balance sheet through endogenously evolving capital ratio targets
and interest rate management strategy.
• Case-by-case quantity rationing based on applicants’ probability of default and the ensuing loan
project expected rate of return.
• Credit worthiness based on operating cash flows and collateral value.
Banks’ interest rates on loans depend on a comparison between bank’s current capital ratio CRbt =
NWbt/L
Tot
bt and the common target CR
T
t ,
17 determined for simplicity reasons as the past-period average
of the sector. When banks are more capitalized than desired, they try to expand further their balance
sheet by attracting more customers on the credit market, offering an interest rate lower than their
competitors’ average. In the opposite case firms want to reduce their exposure: a higher interest rate has
the twofold effect of making bank’s loans less attractive while increasing banks’ margin. Formally:
ilbt =
{
i
l
bt−1(1 + FN) if CRbt < CR
T
t
i
l
bt−1(1− FN) otherwise ,
(3.12)
where i
l
bt−1 =
∑
b∈ΦB
ilbt−1
sizeΦB
is the market average interest rate in the previous period and FN is a draw
from a Folded Normal Distribution (µFN , σ
2
FN ).
Case-by-case credit rationing mechanism starts with banks evaluating applicants’ single-period prob-
ability of default, under the hypothesis thats the loan requested is granted. We define the debt service
variable as the first tranche of payment associated to the hypothetic loan: dsL
d
= (ilbt +
1
η
)Ld. The
probability of a default in each of the 20 periods ahead is then computed using a logistic function, based
on the percentage difference between borrowers’ OCFxt and ds
Ld :
prDx =
1
1 + exp(OCFxt−ςxds
Ld
dsL
d )
, (3.13)
ςc and ςk are two parameters expressing banks’ risk aversion in lending to capital and consumption firms.
The higher ς the more banks are risk averse (i.e. the higher the probability of default for given OCF and
ds).
The expected return of a credit project also depends on firms’ collateral: consumption firms’ collateral
is identified with their stock of real capital. In the case of a default by a consumption firms, each bank
then expects to be able to recover a share δc <≤ 1 of outstanding loans to the defaulted firm c through
fire sales of its capital. δc is equal to ratio between firm’s capital discounted value (see section 3.3)
and firm’s outstanding debt, for all lenders, being revenues from fire sales distributed across creditors
proportionally to their exposure. δk = 0 since capital firms have no collateral. Knowing L
d, ilbt, pr
D
x , δx,
banks compute the overall expected return of a credit project by summing the payoffs arising from each
possible outcome of the decision to grant the loan, each one weighted for its probability of occurrence.
Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representation of the ‘payoffs tree’.
Banks are willing to satisfy agents’ demand for credit whenever the expected return is greater or equal
than zero. Otherwise, the bank may still be willing to provide some credit, if there exist an amount LD∗
for which the expected return is non-negative.
Deposits and bonds market
Banks hold deposits of households and firms.
As banks have to satisfy mandatory liquidity ratios (8%) and since deposits represent a source of
reserves much cheaper than Central Bank cash advances (that is, idbt << i
a
cb) banks compete with each
other on the deposit market.18 As in the case of the capital ratio, we assume that banks have, besides the
mandatory lower bound, a common liquidity target LRTt defined as the sector average in the last period.
17Yet, banks’ capital ratio has a mandatory lower bound (6%).
18Whenever the liquidity ratio falls below the mandatory threshold banks apply for cash advances to the Central Bank
(see 3.5).
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When the liquidity ratio is below the target banks set their interest on deposits as a stochastic premium
over the average interest rate in order to attract customers, and vice-versa when banks have plenty of
liquidity.
idbt =
{
i
d
bt−1(1− FN) if LRbt ≥ LR
T
t
i
d
bt−1(1 + FN) otherwise ,
(3.14)
where FN being drawn from a Folded Normal Distribution (µFN , σ
2
FN ).
Finally, we assume that banks use their reserves in excess of their target (after repayment of previous
bonds by the government) to buy government bonds.Remaining bonds are assumed to be purchased by
the Central Bank.
3.3 Firms’ and banks’ bankruptcy
Firms and banks may go bankrupt when they run out of liquidity or if their net-wealth turns negative.
For simplicity reasons, we assume defaulted firms and banks to be bailed in by households (who are the
owners of firms and banks and receive dividends) and depositors in order to maintain the number of firms
and banks constant.
A bankruptcy by a firm induces non-performing loans for its creditors, who see their net wealth
shrinking. In the case of capital firms, the loss is totally borne by banks, as capital firms do not have
any collateral. In the case of a consumption firm, we assume that its ownership passes temporarily to
creditors which try to recover part of their outstanding loans through fire sales of firm’s physical capital
to households.
In accordance with empirical evidence, we assume the financial value of assets sold through fire sales
to be lowered by a share ι. When the discounted value of capital is greater or equal to the firm’s bad
debt, the loss caused by the bankruptcy falls completely on households’ shoulders. However, in general
the loss is split between households and banks which are able to recover only a fraction of their loans.
Individual households’ contribution to fire sales follows the same rule of dividends distribution (section
3.4), the disbursement being distributed proportionally to households’ net wealth.
Banks default when their net-worth turns negative. We assume depositors bear the loss associated
to the default. In order to restore a positive net-wealth, deposits are lowered up to the point the bank’s
capital ratio equals the minimum capital adequacy requirement (6%), similar to a bail-in process. The
total loss borne by the depositor is distributed proportionally to the scale of their deposits.
3.4 Household behavior
Workers follow an adaptive heuristic to set their reservation wage: if over the year (i.e., four periods), they
have been unemployed for more than two quarters, they lower the asked wage by a stochastic amount.
In the opposite case, they increase their asked wage, provided that the aggregate rate of unemployment
in the previous period (ut−1) is sufficiently low. This latter condition is meant to mimic the endogenous
evolution of workers’ bargaining power in relation to employment dynamics.
wd,ti =
{
wDht−1(1 − FN) if
∑4
n=1 uht−n > 2
wDht−1(1 + FN) if
∑4
n=1 uht−n ≤ 2 and ut−1 ≤ υ,
(3.15)
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where uht = 1 if h is unemployed in t, and 0 otherwise.
Workers consume with fixed propensities α1, α2 out of expected real disposable income and expected
real wealth (Godley and Lavoie, 2007). As workers set their real demand before interacting with con-
sumption firms, they formulate expectations on consumption good prices peht:
cDht = α1
NIht
peht
+ α2
NWht
peht
(3.16)
Gross nominal income is given by wht + i
d
bt−1Dht−1 + Divht if the worker is employed. Households
pay taxes on income with a flat tax rate τi. Unemployed workers receive a tax-exempt dole from the
government defined as a share ω of average wages.
3.5 Government and central bank behavior
The government hires a constant share of households. Public servants are also subject to a turnover ϑ.
Furthermore the government pays unemployment benefits (dt) to unemployed people (Ut).
The state collects taxes on income and profits (with constant rates τi and τpi) from households, firms
and banks and issues bonds bt (at fixed price p
b and interest i
b
) which are assumed to last 1 period for
simplicity reasons:
pb∆bt = Tt + πCBt −
∑
n∈Ngt
wn − Utdt − i
b
pbbt−1, (3.17)
where Tt = THt + TCt + TKt are total taxes, πCBt are Central Bank profits, Ngt is the collection of
public workers.
The Central Bank buys bonds not purchased by commercial banks and accommodates banks’ request
for cash advances. Cash advances are assumed to be repaid after one period and their constant interest
rate represents the upper bound for interest paid by banks on customers’ deposits. For simplicity reasons,
we assume the Central Bank pay no interest on private banks’ reserves account. Finally, Central Bank
earns a profit equal to the flow of interest coming from bonds and cash advances: πCBt = i
b
Bt−1 +
i
a
CBCAcbt. Central Bank’s profits are distributed to the government.
4 Baseline setup: challenges in calibration
Calibration represents a crucial issue for every computational model, in particular when they entail
stochastic, path-dependent, possibly non-ergodic dynamics, as it is usually the case in AB models. Tech-
nical difficulties, time, and computational limits often prevent the modeller from exploring the entire
parameter space and the space of initial endowments of agents, in particular for large-complex macroe-
conomic model. Models are thus usualy explored in a neighborhood of the baseline scenario. Despite
its importance, still only a few AB macro models provide an exhaustive explanation of the procedure
employed to calibrate behavioral parameters, while almost no article provides an explanation of the logic
followed to calibrate initial values of stocks and flows.
In section 1.1, we already stressed that a distorted calibration of financial and real initial stocks may
be a major source logical and accounting inconsistencies in the model, and we discussed the challenges
posed by the initial stock-flow calibration of AB-SFC models. In this section we thus aim to give a
contribution in filling what appears to be a major black hole in the literature by proposing a general and
replicable procedure to address those challenges.
First, the procedure have to define the initial values of the different types of stocks held by each
sector, so that they respect Copeland’s quadruple entry principle. Second, aggregates stocks should then
be distributed across agents within each specific sector, thus characterizing their overall balance sheet.
As described in the previous sections, agents balance sheets are sometimes characterized by the presence
of multiple stocks of the same type, which differ in terms of quantity, age, maturity, prices, and liability
and asset counterparts. In our model, this is the case for loans in firms’ and banks’ balance sheets,
and capital goods in consumption firms’ balance sheets (see section 3.2 and 3.1.4). The third task thus
consists in finding a strategy to characterize each specific stock in these collections and assign it to agents
who hold it as an asset or a liability.
For this sake, we adopted the following six-step strategy:
1. We derive an aggregate version of the model.
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2. We constrain the aggregate model to be in a real stationary state associated with a nominal steady
growth equal to gss. This imply that while all real quantities are constant, all prices and wages are
growing at the same rate gss.
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3. We numerically solve the constrained model by setting exogenously reasonable values for the pa-
rameters for which some empirical information is available (e.g. unemployment rate, mark-ups,
interest rates, income and profit tax rates, etc.) or that we want to control (e.g. technological co-
efficients, number of agents in each sector, distribution of workers across sectors, loans and capital
durations). We then obtain the initial values for each stock and flow variable of the aggregate steady
state, as well as the values of some behavioral parameters, which are hence compatible with the
steady/stationary state (e.g. the propensity to consume out of income, target capacity utilization
and profit rates, initial capital and liquidity targets for banks).
4. We distribute each sector’s aggregate values uniformly across agents’ in that sector. In this way
we derive the total value of each type of stock held by agents (e.g. households’ and firms’ deposits,
total outstanding loans and real capital for each firm, total loans, reserves and bonds for individual
banks etc.) and agents’ past values to be used for expectations (e.g. past sales, past wages, past
profits, etc.).
5. To determine the original amount, outstanding values, age of durable stocks we assume that, in each
of the periods before the simulation starts, firms have obtained a loan and consumption firms have
also acquired new capital batches to replace old capital and maintain their productive capacity. We
further assume that the real value (i.e. corrected for inflation) of each of these loans and capital
batches was constant. Knowing the constant inflation rate gss and the amortization schedules for
capital goods and loans, we can then derive the outstanding value for each of these stocks, so that
the sum of these values is exactly equal to the amount determined in the previous step.
6. In order to set the initial network configuration, we randomly assign a previous period supplier
(required for the matching mechanism) to each demand agent on each market, ensuring that each
supplier has the same number of customers. Similarly, we assign to households’ and firms’ deposits,
and to firms’ loans a randomly selected bank, sot that each bank has the same number (and amount)
of deposits and loans with the same number of agents.
The procedure20 just explained generates an important symmetry condition on agents’ initial char-
acteristics: that is, we start from a situation of perfect homogeneity between agents in order to limit as
much as possible any possible bias embedded in asymmetric initial conditions, and we let heterogeneity
emerge as a consequence of cumulative effects triggered by the stochastic factors embedded in agents’
adaptive rules. Furthermore, by setting initial values based on SS stock-flow norms, we aim to achieve
the threefold objective of limiting our arbitrariness in defining agents’ initial endowments, restricting the
number of free behavioral parameters in the simulation, and find a criterion to set the values of several
others.
Table 3 in the appendix shows the exact value of the parameters used in the baseline setup, specifying
for each one of them, whether it was exogenously set to determine the steady state (‘pre-SS’), derived
from it (‘SS-given’) or following a independent logic (‘free’).
5 Results
After having calibrated the model through the procedure explained in the previous section, we analyzed
the baseline setup by running 100 Monte Carlo simulations for 400 periods. Then, we attempted to
validate the model output by comparing the properties of our artificial time series with their real world
counterparts. Finally, we ran several sensitivity experiments to check the robustness of our results.
Sensitivity tests are performed through a parameter sweep on investigated parameters, and replicating
each scenario 25 times.
19The real steady state constraint is motivated by the fact that workers and technological coefficients are fixed in the
current version of the model.
20A detailed description of the whole calibration procedure is presented in appendix A
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5.1 Model Dynamics
Starting from initial conditions derived as explained in section 4 does not imply in any way that the model
dynamics sticks to the steady state employed in the calibration, nor that the initial symmetry condition
on agents’ setup continues to hold throughout the simulation. As soon as the simulation begins, agents
start to react through their stochastic adaptive rules, agents become heterogeneous as a consequence of
their dispersed interactions, and the “inherent” dynamics of the model starts appearing.
This sections focuses on the analysis of the properties and determinants of this dynamics. Results
presented in this section are obtained by averaging the trends across the 100 Monte Carlo simulations
ran with the baseline set-up.
Several forces concur in shaping the dynamics observed in artificial time series. Since the economy lacks
any coordinating mechanism supervising agents’ decentralized exchanges, thereby ensuring a balanced
growth of inflows and outflows across sectors, agents’ autonomous interactions may lead to significant
changes in the sectoral distribution of real and financial stocks. This in turn affects the stability of aggre-
gates stock-flow norms giving rise to either short term fluctuations or prolonged expansionary/recession
phases.
Tracking the evolution of aggregate flows between sectors is thus crucial to understand the mechanics
of the economic system. However, a second type of interactions across agents plays a crucial role. This is
the interaction between agents within the same class, which takes the form of the competitive processes
undergoing on the different markets governing the evolution of microeconomic agents (see section 5.2 for
the analysis of these microeconomic properties).
Therefore, while the analysis of inter-sectoral flows can help identifying aggregate imbalances, the
analysis of the micro evolution of agents’ balance sheet and market structures helps to identify imbalances
within a sector.
The analysis of variables trends highlights that the model first experiences a succession of expansionary
and recession trends, then converging, in most cases, to a relatively stable configuration of the economy in
which main real aggregates fluctuate around stable values, and nominal aggregates grow at similar rates,
fluctuating around a steady level. We refer to this situation as a “stochastic steady-state”, or “quasi
steady-state” (quasi-SS), while the previous time span constitutes the transition phase of the economy.
A common practice in the analysis of Agent Based modeling is that of scrapping the first periods of
the simulations and focus on the steady state dynamics of the model. The rationale justifying this choice
lies in the fact that AB models are usually characterized by a burn-in period in which the model dynamics
is strongly biased by initial conditions. This practice seems to be totally reasonable when assessing the
effects of exogenous shocks (e.g. a policy regime switch) hitting the dynamics of a system which has
already reached a (quasi) stable configuration. However, we believe it should be taken with a grain of
salt when carrying out the preliminary analysis of the model behaviors and properties, that should come
before the model is employed for policy purposes.
First, there is an inherent arbitrariness in determining which part of the initial dynamics can be
reasonably attributed to possible bias implied by the initial set-up, and which time span reflects instead
the inherent behavior of the model. Second, the analysis of the transient phase, for the very fact of being
characterized by more pronounced (possibly extreme) fluctuations, can provide useful insights on the
mechanisms that generate fluctuations, thereby helping to attain a deeper understanding of the model.
Third, agent based models are normally characterized by the presence of cumulative and multiplicative
processes that make their dynamics strongly path-dependent. This implies that the properties of the
economy in its quasi-stable configuration, such as aggregates levels and aggregates volatilities, depend
on the specific path experienced by the economy during the transition phase. Paraphrasing Kalecki, we
might say that the long run is nothing but a slowly changing component of a chain of short run situations,
with no independent entity; that is, the long-run is a path-dependent sequence of short runs.
For these reasons, we partially depart from the AB macroeconomic literature and discuss first the
whole model dynamics, before characterizing the quasi-SS of the model. Figures 2 and 3 present a
dashboard of various important variables. The transition phase can be divided into three broad phases.
Phase 1 - Self-sustained Growth The first periods of each simulation are heavily affected by the
symmetric condition imposed on agents’ within each sector, which generates a rapid increase in unem-
ployment, followed by an equally rapid recovery.21
21At initial conditions all firms revise upwardly the prices of their output whereas only employed workers can increase
their reservation wage, thus causing an overall loss of purchasing power. The increased mark-ups however increase profits
margins helping to compensate the effect on capacity utilization rates and spurring investment.
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Figure 2: Top Left: Nominal GDP. Top Center: real GDP. Top Right: net-income, consumption prices, and capital prices
rates of growth. Growth rates of prices have been computed using average market prices (weighted for firms’ market shares).
Bottom Left: Unemployment. Bottom Center: Investment and consumption (real units). Bottom Right: number of firms’
bankruptcies. Continuous lines are mean trends over Monte Carlo Simulations. Dashed lines are trends standard deviations
across Monte Carlo runs.
The time between periods 10 and 45 display a self-fuelling real growth process driven by real con-
sumption: higher demand leads to higher employment which further stimulates demand also through the
wages inflationary process. Figure 2 shows that during this phase households net-income rises steadily at
a higher (and increasingly) pace than inflation. Demand for consumption goods thus keeps rising. Real
investment is stable since lower profit margins offset the increased capacity utilization rates. Consump-
tion firms’ returns in fact are squeezed by the reduction of realized markups arising from price and wage
dynamics,22 and by the increased prices of capital goods.
The reduction of profit margins reduces the amount of internal funding available to finance production
and investment, whereas the rise of wages, employment, and capital prices increases expenses. On average,
consumption firms are thus more reliant on external finance. More credit, however, means greater amounts
of liquid resources being diverted towards debt service so that the loans/deposit ratio starts to increase,
see figure 3. Increasing firms’ indebtedness is somehow tempered by a tightening of banks credit rationing
behavior, as a consequence of falling operating cash flows.
The situation at the micro level is far more variegated. Some firms outperform and experience
increasing profits while some undergo a dramatic drain of liquid resources.
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Figure 3: Left: share of unsatisfied demand for credit. Right: Consumption firms’ loans to deposit ratio. Continuous
lines are mean trends over Monte Carlo Simulations. Dashed lines are trends standard deviations across Monte Carlo runs.
Phase 2 - Trend inversion and great recession Wage growth rates tend to stabilize around period
40 so that inflation catches up and eventually surpasses nominal wage growth, compressing household
purchasing power. In the meantime (around period 35) some firms default, not being able to pay wages
and honor their outstanding debt. Firm defaults exerts three effects: wages not paid to workers reduce
22The lag characterizing consumption prices dynamics, compared to net-income growth, can be explained by the fact that
consumption prices are set as an adaptive mark-up over expected unit labor costs. Whenever wages growth accelerates,
firms tend to underestimate labor costs, so that realized mark-ups are lower than desired ones. For expectations to catch
up with actual values, it is required that rates of growth stabilize.
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current demand; fire sales of defaulted firms’ capital goods reduce household deposits (see section 3.3);
firms’ default generally implies a bad-debt affecting banks’ balance sheets and capitalization.
These processes revert the expansionary trend triggering a vicious spiral between successive slumps
in demand and peaks of unemployment between period 45 and 130.23 Only some of the firms are able to
react to the adverse economic environment and continue to grow, while an increasing number experiences
a deep crisis so that the number of defaults keeps rising, fostering a process of increasing concentration
on real markets.
Phase 3 - Recovery and convergence to the quasi steady-state The positive spread between
the fall in wages and that in prices, while reducing households purchasing power, tends to increase
consumption firms’ profit margins. Similarly, the fall of capital prices reduces firms’ investment-related
outlays exerting a positive impact on the profit rate. Finally, defaulted firms are allowed to restart
without the burden of their previous debt. These aspects concur to generate a spur of investment,
notwithstanding the fall of average capacity utilization rates. Real consumption hits the ground around
period 130 and then stabilizes. The system progressively converges to the quasi steady-state position
with unemployment fluctuating just below 8%. After some period, real investment also stabilizes around
the level required to keep consumption firms’ capacity unaltered.24
5.2 Validation
In the final part of 1.1, we argued that checking the logical and accounting coherence of a model should
be a necessary step of the overall validation process of an AB macroeconomic model. Albeit a proper
calibration of initial stocks and flows and a correct description of the accounting records arising from
exchanges between microeconomic agents should be theoretically enough to ensure also the aggregate
accounting coherence, in practice it is not unusual to observe leakages during the model implementation.
This is often the case for large complex AB models embedding a variety of agents and featuring complex
timeline of events and many types of heterogeneous real and financial stocks. We then propose two com-
plementary methods to avoid misspecifications, based on the accounting matrices traditionally employed
in the aggregate SFC literature:
1. The first method consists in deriving the Transaction Flow Matrix and Full Integration Matrix
(Godley and Lavoie, 2007) of the model. Compliance with Copeland’s quadruple entry principle
requires that every row and column of the matrices sum up to zero in every single moment of
the simulation. This reflects the basic facts that every outflow by an agent should also be an
inflow for some agent, and that every financial assets of an agent is also a liability for some other
agents. Deriving the aggregate accounting matrices brings two further advantages: it clarifies the
interdependencies between flows in the economy and it provides a synthetic picture of the evolution
of flows between sectors and sectors’ accumulation of real and financial stocks, thereby helping to
understand the structural dynamics of the model.
2. Since the full integration matrix connects the flows and the stocks of the model, another intuitive
way to check the models SFC is using the economy aggregate balance sheet. The method consists
in checking that the sum of the net worth of all the agents in the economy (including government
and central bank) is exactly equal to the values of real assets in every simulation round. This can
be easily explained by the fact that real stocks are the only assets in the economy which do not
have a liability counterpart. Conversely, every financial stock should be an asset for someone and
a liability for someone else in the economy, so that assets and liabilities offset each other in the
process of summing up.
Tables 1 and 2, in appendix, provide an example of the two checking procedures applied to the initial
period of our simulations.25 The artificial economy displays two types of real assets, inventories and
23As a consequence, wages fall and inflation slows down, although the lag characterizing prices dynamics induces a further
loss in household purchasing power
24It is interesting to notice that the level of real consumption and real investment in the new steady state are respectively
lower and higher than in the initial situation while unemployment is almost the same, implying a redistribution of employees
between consumption and capital firms. In the quasi steady-state neither the aggregate profit rate nor the capacity utilization
rate are at their target levels. Instead, the former is higher while the latter is lower, compensating each other in determining
the level of investment.
25For obvious space reasons, we omit the tables referring to other periods of the simulation.
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consumption firms’ capital. The reader can then easily verify that the total net worth of the economy
exactly matches the total accounting value of these items.
Having checked that the models satisfies these accounting conditions over the complete simulation
time-span, we proceed to the empirical validation of the baseline results. For this sake, following a well
established practice, we compare the properties of our artificial data with a set of empirical stylized facts
collected from other contributions in the AB macroeconomic field, as well as from other empirical studies.
Results suggest that our model provides a good approximation of the properties displayed by real world
data, ranking among the best contributions provided by the literature for the number and the variety of
micro and macroeconomic stylized facts matched.
5.2.1 Macro-stylized facts
Following Assenza et al. (2015), we first compared the volatility, auto, and cross-correlation structures of
main aggregate variables in the model with their empirical counterparts.26 Since our model is calibrated
such that one period corresponds to a quarter, 400 periods correspond to 100 years. Trends and cycle
components have been separated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Figure 4 presents the cyclical component of the artificial time series for GDP, unemployment, invest-
ment, and consumption, each one normalized by the trend in order to allow a comparison on the same
scale. The properties of artificial time series are very close to observed ones. The figure shows that invest-
ment and unemployment volatility are significantly higher than real GDP volatility, while consumption
is slightly less volatile than output. Using US data, Carlin and Soskice (2015) find that the relative
standard deviation (compared to real GDP) of consumption is 0.80, 4.61 for investment, and 8.22 for
unemployment. These values are fairly close to ours: consumption has a relative standard deviation of
0.79 while investment has a relative standard deviation of 4.45. Unemployment instead shows a higher
relative volatility (13.25) compared to empirical data, which can be explained with the relative ease to
fire and hire in the model, where firms are immediately able to adapt the number of employees to the
level of production planned, thus making employment more volatile.
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Figure 4: Cyclical components of simulated times series for Real Output, Unemployment, Investment, and Consumption.
In the left panel of figure 5, we show the artificial and observed auto-correlations of the de-trended
series up to the 20th lag. The auto-correlation structure of artificial times series looks remarkably similar
to the auto-correlation function of observed real data. All variables have strong positive first order
auto-correlations.27
The right panel of figure 5 shows the cross-correlations between the cyclical component of real output
at time t and of real output, unemployment, real investment, and real consumption at time t − lag.
The position of the peak in each correlation figure indicates whether the variable is lagged, coincident or
leading with respect to output. The shape, dimension and the position of the peak of our simulated time
series provide a very good fit of the properties shown by real time series.
The fundamental properties of our simulated time series highlighted above are robust across the
experiments performed in the sensitivity analysis,28 though the absolute values of the correlations slightly
change. In particular, investment always appears to be pro-cyclical and coincident with real output,
unemployment is counter-cyclical and lagged by a quarter, while consumption is always pro-cyclical and
26Real time series are taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED): they are quarterly data ranging from
1955-01-01 to 2013-10-01 for unemployment (not seasonally adjusted, FRED code: LRUN64TTUSQ156N) and ranging
from 1947-01-01 to 2013-10-01 for investments, consumption and GDP (FRED codes: PCECC96, GPDIC96, and GDPC1
respectively).
27A remarkable difference, however, has to be found in the 20th auto-correlation of investment and unemployment which
look significantly higher than real ones. This inconsistency is easily explained in light of our assumption that real capital
has a duration of 20 periods before being scrapped off. This introduces a significant cyclical component in real investment.
28For space reasons we omit the figures concerning the sensitivity scenarios. These are available online at:
https://github.com/S120/benchmark
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Figure 5: Left Panel: Average artificial (continuous) and real (dashed) auto-correlations of the de-trended series up
to the 20th lag. Bars are standard deviations of Monte Carlo average auto-correlations. Right Panel: Average artificial
(continuous) and real (dashed) cross-correlations of the de-trended series up to the 10th lag. Bars are standard deviations
of Monte Carlo average cross-correlations.
may be either coincident or slightly lagged by a quarter according to the specification employed. This
suggests that the fundamental properties of the correlation structure observed in artificial data is an
inherent property of the model rather than being dependent on a specific parametrization. That is,
changing the parameters of the model, obviously changes the behavior of agents (e.g. making banks less
or more prone to grant credit) affecting the evolution of main economic aggregates both in the short and
long term. However, the way these aggregates impact on each other, which is captured by the underlying
correlation structure of macroeconomic variables, is kept unaltered in its main properties.29
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Figure 6: Average artificial cross-correlations of the de-trended series up to the 10th lag. Bars are standard deviations of
Monte Carlo average cross-correlations. Consumption firm’s leverage can be defined in two ways: total debt to net worth
ratio (top graph) or total assets to total debt ratio (bottom graph).
The model also reproduces several other important macroeconomic stylized facts observed in reality.
Figure 6 (left panel) highlights that, in accordance with the empirical evidence on business cycles, inflation
29This is consistent with economic reality where, despite the changes in agents’ habits and ‘animal spirits’, the properties
of the correlation structure of macroeconomic aggregates is fairly stable, thus justifying their adoption as a criteria to
validate macroeconomic models.
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is pro-cyclical and lagging (tending to build up during an expansion and fall after the cyclical peak),
whereas mark-ups are counter-cyclical and lagging, see Bils (1987) and, for a survey of the literature on
business cycles and countercyclical markups, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).30
In addition, the model assumption that firms revise adaptively their prices every period of the sim-
ulation (i.e. a quarter) is fairly in line with the evidence provided in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) that
find a monthly frequency of price changes of 29.3% (implying a pseudo-average duration of 3.4 months).
Their paper also highlights that, despite moderate inflation is the norm, there is no evidence of prices
downward rigidity at the microeconomic level, as price decreases account for 45% of total price changes.
Price decreases in a context of moderate inflation (see below) are not uncommon (though less frequent)
in our model as well, where the frequency of price-decreases ranges between 0.30 and 0.40 aproximately
across the baseline Monte Carlo runs.
Figure 7 shows that changes in inventories are pro-cyclical whereas the inventories/sales ratio is
counter-cyclical as we would expect by looking at the empirical literature (see Bils and Kahn, 2000).
Usually, during a business downturn, firms let their inventories decline producing less. In the model, a
drop in real sales reduces the desired amount of inventories which is defined as a constant share of sales.
However, since unsold inventories are accumulated, the drop is less than proportional with respect to sales,
explaining the counter cyclical relation between the inventories/sales ratio and real output. When the
downturn reaches its turning point, firms fall short of inventories as a consequence of the rise in sales,31
and revise upwardly, with a lag, the amount of inventories they want to hold, increasing production.
Inventories thus grows with a lag with respect to sales during expansions until the cycle is eventually
reverted.
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Figure 6 (right panel) shows that banks’ leverage, defined as total loans over banks’ net worth, is
pro-cyclical displaying a cross correlation with real GDP at lag 0 equal to 0.25, in line with the statistics
provided by Nun˜o and Thomas (2013) which estimates a correlation of 0.18 and ranging between 0.12 and
0.36, according to the definition of leverage adopted. This is a consequence of the pro-cyclical behavior
of firms’ total debt (explained below): the endogeneity of money in the model and the adoption of stock
flow consistent rules implies that, as in reality, every new loan is accompanied by the creation of a new
deposit of equal value, so that the loan creation process corresponds to an expansion of banks’ balance
sheets which leaves unaltered their net worth (Barwell and Burrows, 2011; Jakab and Kumhof, 2015;
Benes et al., 2014; McLeay et al., 2014). Given the absence of other financial assets, such as real estates
or shares, whose value can be affected by the rise of liquid assets circulating in the economy, every new
loan thus increases the numerator of the leverage while keeping constant the denominator.
In addition to the evidence on leverage cyclicality, Nun˜o and Thomas (2013) find that banks’ leverage
is almost twice as volatile as real output. This is consistent with our finding that banks’ leverage relative
standard deviation is equal to 1.69.
Firms’ leverage and firms’ total debt are pro-cyclical (figure 6, right panel), and show a cross-
correlation structure similar to banks’ leverage that can be explained as a consequence of the fact that
consumption firms’ credit account for the vast majority of banks’ loans, capital firms’ debt representing
30The pro-cyclicality of inflation is explained by the fact that firms change adaptively their desired mark-up according to
their sales performance, so that during upturns they increases (on average) prices, and vice-versa. However, the markup is
then applied on expected unit labor costs. If wages keep rising as a consequence of lower unemployment, realized unit labor
costs will be higher than expected ones, more than compensating the increase in desired markups. The opposite happens
during dowturns, thus explaining the counter-cyclical behavior of markups.
31Actually this can happen even before the turning point if the recession slows down and firms underestimate the demand
for their products.
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a minor share of banks outstanding credit.32 The pro-cyclicality of firms’ total debt is another well-
known stylized fact, as shown by C. and Morgan (2006); Leary (2009). In the model, firms increase their
debt during expansion phases to fund increased investment and possibly as a consequence of inflationary
pressures on wages, which tend to reduce the sources of internal funding. Banks may accommodate the
demand for loans as a consequence of an increased reliability of firms’, proxied by their operating cash
flows.33 The empirical evidence on firms’ leverage is more controversial and varies across countries and
industries. Halling et al. (2012), for example, finds that leverage by non-financial corporations is counter-
cyclical in “civil law’ countries and countries with low debt-holder protection, whereas it is significantly
pro-cyclical in “common law” countries and countries with relatively high debt-holder protection, such
as the US.
Finally, real output growth rates generated in the model show the well-known tent-shaped leptokurtic
distribution (with excess kurtosis ≈ 0.70) observed in real world (Fagiolo et al., 2008), as displayed
in figure 7 (right). In addition, although using constant labor and capital productivities and a fixed
number of workers and thus impeding ever-lasting real growth, the model generates exponential long-
term nominal growth with moderate inflation, as observed in reality. In the baseline quasi steady-state,
prices of consumption goods and nominal GDP grow at an annual rate of approximately 1.6-1.8% (see
figure 2).
5.2.2 Micro-stylized facts
The model is also able to reproduce several important stylized facts at the microeconomic level. De-
spite agents within each class are almost perfectly homogeneous at the beginning of our simulations,
heterogeneity emerges during the simulation, first as a consequence of the inherent stochasticity affecting
agents’ interactions and adaptive behaviors, and then as the result of the path-dependent/cumulative
effects arising from agents’ competition on real and financial markets. The selection processes affects
the evolution of market structures, from an initial situation in which firms’ market shares are all equal
towards a more concentrated market.
Following van der Hoog and Dawid (2015), figure 8 plots the evolution of consumption and capital
firms’ market shares. For graphical reasons, we plot the values referring to 20 firms belonging to each
class, over the time span (200:400) of a single simulation. The plots show that market shares in the model
are not only characterized by an high degree of heterogeneity among firms, but also by high persistency,
both for consumption and capital firms.
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Figure 8: Market shares persistency (left and center): Lines refer to 20 consumption (left) and capital (right) firms in
the time span (200:400) of a single run. Invesment lumpiness (right): lines refer to 5 consumption firms in the time span
(200:300) of a single run.
Competition in consumption and capital markets steers the evolution of industries structure over
time. In line with empirical evidence, distributions of firm sizes appear to be right skewed and fat-tailed
for both capital and consumption firms, regardless the measure used for consumption firm size (i.e. real
sales or firms’ productive capacity).34 The fat-tailed, right skewed nature of firm size distribution, with
upper-tails made of few large firms, is well know since Gibrat’s seminal contribution though the shape of
the distribution may vary considerably across countries and industries.
32This in turn is explained by the fact that consumption firms’ demand for loans is mainly driven by investment needs,
whereas capital firms possibly demand credit only to fund production.
33Notice however that it might be the case that firms expand their indebtedness by a lower degree than desired if banks
perceive the increased demand for loans as too risky. This is reflected in the dynamics of the credit gap in the baseline, i.e
the share of unsatisfied demand for credit, which can increase even during expansions.
34Consumption and capital firm size distribution, as measured by firms’ sales, has a skewness equal to 0.83 and 2.88
respectively, while using productive capacity the skewness for consumption firms is equal to 0.55. The excess kurtosis for
firms’ sales distribution is equal to 0.49 for consumption and 10.20 for capital firms thus characterizing both distributions
as leptokurtic. Consumption firms’ capacity distribution has an excess kurtosis equal to 0.11.
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For a long time, the conventional wisdom maintained that expected firm growth rates are independent
of size (Gibrat’s Law), and that the firm size distribution is stable and approximately log-normal. Stanley
et al. (1995) confirm that, like in earlier studies, the log-normal distribution fits the data well except
for the upper tail, which contrary to the common belief are thinner rather than fatter. On the same
line Cabral and Mata (2003) finds that the log-normal fits well data for firms with publicly available
accounting data, while using more complete datasets the firm size distribution is more right-skewed,
though evolving over time toward a more symmetric one if we consider firm size distribution for groups of
different ages. Bottazzi and Secchi (2003) finds that the empirical densities of US firm size distributions
display a remarkable degree of stationarity over time and are very well approximated by a log-normal
fit, confirming the results of Stanley et al. (1995). Axtell (2001) on the contrary finds that firm size
distribution in the US can be approximated by Zipf distribution, that is a Pareto distribution with
unitary exponent. However, using data from G7 countries Gaffeo et al. (2003) finds that only in limited
cases the exponent is equal to -1, although data are broadly consistent with a power law distribution.35
Figure 9 provides the log-log plot of firm size distribution photographed at period 350 of the 100
Monte Carlo Simulations.36 The graphs shows that firms are highly heterogeneous with respect to their
size, and their size distribution displays fat tails.37 The graphs also show the log-normal (green line) and
Pareto (red) fits of the upper tails, showing that both types of distributions roughly fit the data, although
the log-normal fit generally seems to be preferred, in accordance with the empirical evidence in the wake
of Gibrat’s contribution (Stanley et al., 1995). In order to fit the data, we follow the procedure explained
in Clauset et al. (2009) for the Power Law estimation and we then perform a bootstrap to check the
plausibility of the power law distribution hypothesis, which is accepted for p-values above 0.1.38 In all
cases the p-value is very high (0.84 and 1 for consumption firms’ size distribution based on productive
capacity and sales respectively, 0.99 for capital firms real sales distribution) indicating that the power
law hypothesis is plausible. Then, we estimate with a similar procedure the log-normal and we formally
compare the power law with the alternative log-normal hypotheses via Vuong’s likelihood ratio test. A
low p-value indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of both distributions being equally far from
the true one. Whenever the likelihood ratio is significantly different from zero, then its sign indicates
whether the log-normal is favored over the power-law model or not. For consumption firms we obtain
that the log normal is favored regardless the measure of size adopted,39 whereas for capital firms’ the
p-value is 0.85 and the ratio close to 0, indicating that the null hypothesis that both distributions equally
fit the data cannot be rejected.
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Figure 9: Consumption and Capital firms size distributions. The figures also displays the log-normal (green) and power-law
(red) fits of the right tails of the sample distributions.
In addition, the model is able to reproduce a certain degree of lumpiness in investment at the micro
35However, we shall stress that this divergence of results is somehow mitigated by the fact that the log-normal and
power-law distributions are intrinsically connected. Indeed, small variations from the pure multiplicative stochastic process
underlying the Gibrat’s law can change the result from one to the other, see Aitchison and Brown (1957) and Sahota (1978).
In particular, several contribution shows that a power-law distribution can be obtained by adding a reflective barrier (Levy
and Solomon, 1996) in the form of a lower bound, or an additive noise, or a stochastic resetting of the size (Nirei and
Souma, 2004) to the stochastic multiplicative model.
36The same plots has been analyzed for several periods between 300 and 400 showing that, in accordance with empirical
evidence, firms’ size distribution is fairly stable after the model reaches its quasi-SS.
37Jarque-Bera tests for normality in the distribution of consumption and capital firm sizes all yield a p-value equal to 0,
indicating that the normal distribution hypothesis must be rejected. The χ2 statistic is equal to 629.58 for consumption
firms’ capacity, 896.076 for consumption firms’ sales, and 12546.87 for capital firms’ sales.
38The p-value indicates the frequency of cases in which the distance of sample data from a theoretical power law having
lower bound and exponent equal to the estimated ones is lower than the distances of the set of synthetic data sets randomly
drawn from the same theoretical power law model. A p-value close to 1 then indicates that the difference between sample
data and the model can be attributed to statistical fluctuations alone.
39More precisely, we obtain a p-value equal to 0.001 and a test statistic equal to -3.2 when employing firms’ capacity, and
a p-vale of 0.005 and likelihood ratio of -2.8 when we use firms’ real sales instead.
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level, as observed in real world. For graphical clarity reasons, figure 8 (right) displays real investment,
measured in capital units, for 5 randomly chosen consumption firms over the time span (200:300) of a
single simulation in the baseline scenario. The plot highlights that investment is not smoothed over the
time span, but rather displays successive spikes, followed by periods in which investment is significantly
lower, or even null. Firms investment depends on their expected sales, the stock of unsold inventories,
and the profit rate. When firms, as a consequence of a drop in sales or profits (either related to the
business cycle or to competitive pressures) end up having a capacity of production higher than the
desired one, they replace just a part of capital vintages reaching obsolescence, or they even refrain from
investing. On the contrary, investment can rise significantly when things are going well in order to
increase firm’s productive capacity. Since a real capital batch acquired in a given period is scrapped all
at once when it reaches technical obsolescence (20 periods), rather than being scrapped gradually (as
it happens for its financial amortization), these changes in investment tend to replicate in subsequent
periods. These cyclical effects overlap to the effects caused by new changes in market conditions on the
desired production capacity. This generates the lumpy and cyclical patterns of investment observed in
the figure as an emergent property of the model, i.e. without having embedded this feature ex-ante in
the behavior of agents’.40
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Figure 10: Bank Credit Distribution (left), bank credit degree distribution (center), and bad debt distribution (right).
The figures also displays the log-normal (green) and power-law (red) fits of the right tails of the sample distributions.
In figure 10, we analyze the distribution of banks’ credit degree and bank credit through the log-log
plots obtain by collecting data referring at period 350 of the 100 simulations run for the baseline. As
pointed out by Lux (2014), while firm size distribution and its determinants have been throughly studied
over the last eighty years, it seems that the banking sector had been a blank spot, primarily, but not
exclusively, as a consequence of the lack of data available on the size and distribution of activity within the
banking sector. The empirical evidence available on banks credit distribution is thus limited, in particular
for credit extended to non-financial firms. Nonetheless, de Masi and Gallegati (2007), using Italian data,
presents some evidence on the banks-firms network topology. They find that the number of degree of
banks is far higher than that of firms, and that banks’ degree distribution shows fat-tails, suggesting that
some banks finance a large number of firms, thereby having higher outstanding credit than predicted by
a normal distribution. Our figures are in line with these findings under both respects. Both credit and
degree distributions of banks have positive skewness (equal to 0.27 for bank credit degree distribution
and 0.69 for bank credit distribution) suggesting the presence of fat tails. Normality Jarque-Bera tests
reject the normal distribution hypothesis for both distributions.41 Figure 10 displays the log-log plot of
the two distributions with the log-normal and power-law fits of the right tails, obtained following the
same methodology adopted for firm size distribution. In addition, while most firms end up having 1 to
3 links to different banks, the average degree of banks is 13.37. Graphically this can be also observed
in figure 11 which displays the evolution of the community structure of the banks-firms directed credit
network from the initial symmetric situation - where firms’ are assumed to have the same number of links
(i.e. loans) to the same number of banks and banks are assumed to have the same degree - to the final
period of the simulation.
Finally, the distributions of firms’ bad debt (figure 10, right) and firms’ bankruptcies reflect the
properties observed in the empirical counterparts:42 being both right skewed and characterized by positive
excess kurtosis, thereby suggesting the presence of fat-tails.43
40Indeed, an alternative way to generate lumpy investment is to impose a “trigger” level of investment in firms’ investment
heuristics which characterizes firms expansionary investment strategy as a “yes or no” decision (see for example Dosi et al.
(2006)).
41We obtain p-value=0, χ2=26.074 for credit degree distribution, and p-value=0, χ2=77.912 for banks’ credit distribution.
42In particular, Di Guilmi et al. (2004) and Delli Gatti et al. (2004) suggests that both distributions have right tails
scaling down to a Pareto.
43The skewness is equal to 2.16 for firms’ bad debt and 1.97 for firms’ bankruptcies, whereas the former has an excess
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Figure 11: Credit Network Community Structure: arrows point from liability holders (firms) to asset holders (banks).
5.3 Robustness checks
Our previous analysis shows that investment and credit demand behaviors by firms on the one side, and
credit supply behaviors by banks on the other, play a crucial role in steering the economy across successive
expansionary and recessive phases. The question of how different parametrizations of investment and
credit behaviors affects the transition phase, the properties of the economy in the long run, and the
robustness of the cyclical properties employed to validate the model then arises.
We performed sensitivity experiments on the parameters referring to investment and credit behav-
iors:44 ςc and ςk, defining banks’ risk aversions in assessing consumption and capital firms reliability, γ1
and γ2, the weights given to the profit rate and capacity utilization arguments in consumption investment,
and σ expressing firms’ precautionary deposits. Each sensitivity analysis45 was carried out by performing
a parameter sweep over the parameter of interest. The range of variation for each parameter is specified
in table 3, in the appendix. For each parameter configuration (i.e. for each scenario) we ran 25 Monte
Carlo simulations.
Our results confirm that all the cyclical properties of our artificial time series discussed in section 5.2
continue to hold under all the scenarios investigated, and provide a very good match of the empirical
stylized facts discussed in the literature. This suggests that, although changes in the parameters employed
in the sensitivity experiments may affect the transition and long term dynamics of the model, the causal
structure of the model and the structural inter-dependencies between its main variables is not subverted.
More important, this provides some (non exhaustive) evidence for the fact that the model ability to
replicate macroeconomic cross-correlations is not originated by the specific parametrization employed.
As a final remark on the robustness of our results, we are aware that the way agents make expectations
would also deserve some attention: although the simple adaptive expectations scheme employed in the
model is well-established in the literature (recent examples are Assenza et al., 2015; Dosi et al., 2010,
and later works), several authors has recently stressed the relevance of heterogeneous expectations in
models employed for policy analysis (Assenza et al., 2013b,a). On the same line, Salle et al. (2013)
proposes a model where agents’ simple adaptive heuristics are continuously revised through a learning
process. Despite this type of application goes beyond the objective of the present paper, we believe that
heterogeneous expectations and endogenous learning are very promising lines of development in the AB
literature, and would represent a valuable addition to the present model as well.46
kurtosis equal to 2.16 and the latter 1.32. The tests rejects the normality hypothesis for both distributions with p-value
equal to 0 in both cases and test-statistic equal to 19000.74 and 13378.20 respectively. The bootstrapping hypothesis tests
on the power law estimated models confirm that the right tails of both distributions are broadly compatible with a Power-
law (p-value equal to 1 for the bad debt distribution and 0.29 for firms’ bankruptcies), although the log-likelihood tests
suggest that the simulated distribution is better approximated by a log-normal, diverging in this respect from the evidence
provided by Di Guilmi et al. (2004); Delli Gatti et al. (2004).
44Admittedly, several other parameters are likely to exert an impact, such as the rate of taxation, the threshold employed
in workers reservation wage function, or households’ propensities to consume. However, besides space and tractability
reasons, let us point out that the values of these parameters have been jointly derived (see appendix A.1) in order to
be compatible with the SFC initial setup. Changing their values would then impose an exogenous shock on the model or
require to change the initial configuration of stocks and flows, in both cases preventing a direct comparison with the baseline
calibration.
45The figures and tables summarizing the results of the five sensitivity experiments can be found on the platform web
page: https://github.com/S120/benchmark. For a discussion of the different scenarios see:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2664125
46In order to move in this direction, we made a preliminary investigation by running 5 simulations using different speci-
fications of the ‘anchoring and adjustment’ and ‘trend-following’ schemes presented in Assenza et al. (2013b). Preliminary
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Figure 12: Nominal GDP, real GDP, and unemployment (trends). Lighter gray lines correspond to higher values of the
parameter.
As a matter of example, we discursively comment the effects of different risk attitudes by banks in
evaluating consumption firms’ probability of default, as expressed by the parameter ςc in equation (3.13).
The example is useful to stress once again that given the endogenous nature of private money, banks
have significantly higher flexibility in extending credit than predicted by the loanable fund approach
still employed in the vast majority of DSGE models. Changes in the risk attitude of banks can greatly
affect the amount of credit lend to the economy, even when banks are subject to the same institutional
constraints.
Figures 12 and 13 show that higher values of risk aversion are associated with higher real output (higher
real consumption and moderately lower real investment), lower unemployment, and higher inflation (as
reflected by the dynamics of nominal GDP).
The analysis of the dynamics generating these properties is particularly insightful: a more prudent
attitude by banks prevents consumption firms from going into excessive debt (figure 13, right) during
expansionary phases, lessening in a significant way the amplitude and duration of the recession in the
transition. In the three experiments in which the risk aversion parameter is the highest, the economy
completely avoids the recession phase experienced in the baseline and low-risk-aversion scenarios.
In these cases the model displays a smooth transition towards the quasi steady-state and tend to
converge more rapidly than in low-risk-aversion cases. The prevention of the recession in turn enables
the system to attain a balanced growth of prices, wages, profits, investment, GDP, and credit, avoiding
the emergence of excessive imbalances in financial flows between different sectors. The economy ends up
having more real output and lower unemployment, but also more credit and more inflation than in the
baseline, in spite of the fact that firms are individually subjected to stricter credit constraints.47
These dynamics highlighted are in line with the main results of the overwhelming stream of literature
that has stressed the central role of financial factors and financial institutions in shaping business cycles,
starting from the seminal work of Minsky (1986). In particular, the marked recession experienced in the
transition under the more risky scenarios and the slower convergence to the quasi-ss are in line with the
recent findings of Jorda et al. (2012), showing that more credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed
by deeper recessions and slower recoveries.
Although the model is not directly employed for policy analysis in the present paper, the dynamics
observed in the baseline and the results of our sensitivity example confirms the topicality of the arguments
proposed in order to justify our modelling approach and stress the pivotal importance of the credit
creation theory of banking in a macroprudential policy perspective, in line with the recent empirical
evidence provided by Werner (2014, 2015). These works highlight that the currently prevalent financial
intermediation theory of banking, assuming that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just
like other non-bank financial intermediaries, have no empirical foundation. In line with the results of
the sensitivity example, Werner (2015) shows that standard theory systematically underestimate banks’
flexibility in creating money through credit and throw doubts on capital adequacy and fractional reserve-
based bank regulation which find their rationale in the loanable funds approach.
analysis of the results suggests that the basic cyclical properties of the model seems to hold for many variables and under
the majority of cases investigated. Yet, expectations specifications which allow for big jumps from period to period sig-
nificantly increase the volatility of macroeconomic variables (in particular in the initial phases), also affecting the shape
of the cross-correlation structure of several variables, which appear to be less smooth than in the baseline described here.
Obviously these result may be reverted if agents have heterogeneous, endogenously switching, expectations.
47Very similar dynamics are obtained for lower values of the parameter σ, although in this case the mechanism operates
on the credit demand side.
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Figure 13: Consumption units, investment units, and share of unsatisfied credit (trends). Lighter gray lines correspond
to higher values of the parameter.
6 Conclusions
The paper moved from a discussion of the limits of prevailing approaches to macroeconomic modeling.
We then discussed the advantages and current limitations of two alternative modeling approaches to
macroeconomics, namely the Agent Based and the Stock Flow Consistent frameworks, and we argue in
favor of a combination of the two methodologies to be built upon an explicit, realistic, and coherent
modeling of individual agents balance sheets and their co-evolution driven by agents’ disperse exchanges.
The paper aimed at contributing to this nascent literature in two ways: first, we presented a relatively
simple, general and flexible benchmark macroeconomic AB-SFC model to be employed in future works for
policy analysis purposes, in particular in the field of bank regulation in a macro-prudential perspective.
Second, we present a set of coherent rules and tools to design, calibrate, analyze, and validate AB-SFC
models, giving particular attention to the requirement of logical and accounting consistency of these
models. Notably, the paper highlights several challenges regarding the calibration of AB-SFC models
and proposes a novel approach to solve these issues, thus aiming to shed some light on what appears to
be a neglected aspect of the AB and AB-SFC model-building methodologies.
As a preliminary step before the model can be employed for policy analysis, our results have been
throughly validated by comparing the cyclical properties of our artificial time series with their empirical
counterparts and with several macroeconomic stylized facts highlighted in the literature on business cycles.
In addition, we also checked the model ability to match several important microeconomic empirical facts.
Our results are very promising, suggesting that the model is able to replicate a significant number of
macroeconomic and microeconomic empirical regularities. Sensitivity checks provide some evidence that
the cyclical properties of the model hold under different parameterizations.
The analysis of the long term dynamics highlights that, under the majority of cases analyzed, the
economy tends to converge to what we defined as a “quasi-SS”, which provides the starting point and a
benchmark to perform policy analysis in the next works. Results suggest that the interaction of real and
financial factors plays a crucial role in driving both short-term business cycles and the long-term evolution
of the economic system. Under certain conditions firms and banks may go into excessive investment and
credit, which tends to feed financial and real instability affecting the dynamics of the economy also in
the long run. Our analysis also confirms that banks are generally far more flexible and less constrained
by capital and liquidity requirements than what implied by the loanable funds approach, suggesting that
policy macro-prudential prescriptions of standard models may be less effective than usually thought in
regulating the banking sector.
The present work is the starting point of a broader research agenda. Although bank regulation -
either through macro or micro prudential policies, or unconventional policies (e.g. credit and quantitative
easing) - represent the natural field of application of the model, the proposed framework is open to several
possible developments and integrations. Some of them are already ongoing, such as the introduction of
R&D investment and innovation dynamics in the capital good industry, which would open the possibility
for long-term, self-sustained real growth in the model, possibly enhancing the model ability to give account
of empirical regularities. The inclusion of households’ debt, real estates, income and wealth-dependent
consumption behaviors, and proper portfolio functions are further examples of future integrations to the
current framework.
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A Baseline Calibration
As explained in section 4 our procedure is based on the imposition of a real stationary state coupled
with a nominal steady state growth (i.e. inflation) at the macroeconomic level. More precisely, we first
declare a set of exogenous parameters, aggregate variables, and stock-flow norms that we fix at reasonable
values (see section A.4). Then we employ the accounting identities and the steady state (SS hereafter)
conditions to find a numerical solution to the system.
For tractability and explanatory reasons we divided the SS system of equations in three sub-systems:
the first block contains the equations which refer to capital good producers (section A.1), the second
presents the set of equations related to consumption firms (section A.2), and the third (section A.3)
refers to households, banks and the public sector (government and central bank). Once the first block of
the system is solved, its solution are employed to solve the second sub-system, whose solutions in turn
are used to solve the third one.
A.1 Capital firms SS relations
In the equations, letters in bold type indicate the dependent variables of the system. All other variables
and parameter values are set exogenously to characterize numerically the SS.
The first block is a system of ten equations in ten unknowns referring to capital firms and, indirectly,
to banks, as far as loans and deposits in the capital sector balance sheet are concerned. Equation A.1
states that workers employed in the capital sector Nk should be equal to the real output of capital firms
yk divided by labor productivity µN . Prices of capital goods pk (eq. A.3) are a markup muk over unit
(variable) costs, which are equal to wages W over labor productivity (eq. A.2). Capital firms want to
hold an amount of deposits Dk equal to a fraction sigma of wages paid to workers (eq. A.4). Since we
have stationary state in real terms, capital firms’ real output is exactly equal to replacement investment
realized by consumption firms’ ic in order to replace obsolete capital. This in turn is equal to total real
capital k over real capital duration κ (eq. A.5). Real capital inventories (eq. A.6) are constant and equal
to a share ν of real output (i.e. sales). Profits of capital firms are revenues from sales plus interests
on previous period deposits, plus the variation of nominal inventories (evaluated at their unit costs of
production uck), minus wages and interests paid on the previous-period stock of loans (eq. A.7). Notice
that past period values of nominal variables will be equal to the current value divided by (1 + gSS), gSS
being the exogenously imposed SS nominal rate of growth. A fraction τk of profits goes to pay taxes (eq.
A.8), while a share ρk of remaining net profits is distributed as dividends to households (eq. A.9). Finally,
for accounting reasons the variation of loans (eq. A.10) should be equal to the sum of the variation in the
nominal value of inventories and the variation of deposits, minus retained earnings (see the KA column
for the capital sector in the Transaction Flow Matrix presented in appendix A).
Nk =
yk
µN
(A.1)
uck =
WNk
yk
=
W
µN
(A.2)
pk = (1 +muk)uck (A.3)
Dk = σWNk (A.4)
yk = (ic =)
k
κ
(A.5)
invk = νyk (A.6)
pik = pkyk +
idDk
1 + gSS
+ invk
gSS
1 + gSS
uck −WNk −
ilLk
1 + gSS
(A.7)
Tk = pikτk (A.8)
Divk = ρk [pik(1− τk)] (A.9)
Lk(
gSS
1 + gSS
) = (invk
gSS
1 + gSS
uck) + (Dk
gSS
1 + gSS
)− (pik −Tk −Divk) (A.10)
A.2 Consumption firms SS relations
The second block of equations refers to consumption firms. Workers employed in the consumption
sector are computed by dividing output for labor productivity in the consumption sector (eq. A.11). By
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definition, labor productivity in the case of a technology which employs labor and capital fixed coefficients
is equal to the product of capital productivity µk and the fixed capital-labor ratio lK . Prices are a markup
muc over unit variable costs (eq. A.15), defined as wages paid to workers over output (eq. A.12). Unit
costs are computed as overall production costs, including the financial amortization of capital, divided
by output (eq. A.13). Since we are in a real stationary state and given the assumption that capital
lasts for κ periods, consumption firms invest in each period to buy an amount of k/κ capital goods in
order to replace the batch of obsolete capital (purchased κ periods ahead) thus keeping the total stock of
capital k constant. Since we further assume a linear financial amortization of capital, consumption firms
register an amortization cost equal to a share 1/κ of the disbursement originally incurred to buy each
batch of capital. This disbursement was equal to k
κ
pk
(1+gSS)t
for each batch purchased t = 1, ..., κ periods
ahead. Therefore amortization costs are equal to pkk
κ2
∑j=1
κ
1
(1+gSS)j
. Following the same reasoning, we
can determine the nominal value of the stock of capital held by consumption firms Kc as expressed by
equation A.14. Consumption firms want to hold a share σ of wages as deposits (eq. A.16). Output is
given by the stock of capital multiplied by the rate of capacity utilization u and by the productivity of
capital (eq. A.17). Real inventories are a share of real sales, which in the SS are equal to output (eq.
A.18). Profits in the case of consumption good producers differ from those of capital firms, as they also
include the amortization cost of previously purchased capital batches (eq. A.19). Taxes and dividends
are then defined as in the case of capital good producers (eq. A.20 and eq. A.21). The variation of loans
granted to consumption firms can be obtained by exploiting the capital account identity (see column KA
for the consumption sector in the Transaction Flow Matrix presented in appendix A) for the consumption
sector. The difference with respect to the correspondent equation for capital firms is the inclusion of the
investment and amortization flows (eq. A.22).
Nc =
yc
µK lK
(A.11)
uvcc =
WNc
yc
(A.12)
ucc =
WNc +
pkk
κ2
∑κ
j=1
1
(1+gSS)j
yc
(A.13)
Kc =
pkk
κ2
κ∑
j=1
j
(1 + gSS)CL−j
(A.14)
pc = (1 +muc)uvcc (A.15)
Dc = σWNc (A.16)
yc = kuµK (A.17)
invc = νyc (A.18)
pic = pcyc +
idDc
1 + gSS
+ invc
gSS
1 + gSS
ucc −WNc −
ilLc
1 + gSS
−
pkk
κ2
κ∑
j=1
1
(1 + gSS)j
(A.19)
Tc = picτc (A.20)
Divc = ρc [pic(1− τc)] (A.21)
Lc(
gSS
1 + gSS
) = (icpk)(invc
gSS
1 + gSS
ucc) + (Dc
gSS
1 + gSS
)− (pic −Tc −Divc)−
pkk
κ2
κ∑
j=1
1
(1 + gSS)j
(A.22)
The second block thus presents a system of twelve equations in twelve unknowns, where bold letters
indicate dependent variables, as usual. Notice that variables referring to capital firms, such as pk or νk,
are no longer indicated as dependent variables, as their value was already computed in the first block of
the SS system of equation.
A.3 The rest of the economy
The third block of equations encompasses the relations referring to the households and banking sectors,
plus those related to the public sector which is composed of the general government and the central bank.
Total employment is given by the sum of workers hired by the consumption, capital, and public sectors
(eq. A.23). Households’ income is composed of wages, interests on deposits, dividends and the tax-exent
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dole ωW that unemployed workers receive from the government . Dividends are distributed by firms and
bank to households at the end of the period, after households have consumed and firms and banks have
paid taxes. Therefore, we assume that dividends from period t− 1 enter in the (behavioral) definition of
the gross income of households of period t (although they have already increased the amount of deposits
held by households in period t-1, see equation ...) Net income is then defined by equation A.24, whereas
taxes paid by households are given by equation A.25. Real consumption is a function of real net income
and the real net-wealth inherited from the previous period (eq. A.26). Given the stationary state condi-
tion real consumption is exactly equal to the amount of goods produced by consumption firms (eq. A.27).
Nominal consumption is obtained by multiplying real consumption for the price of consumption good (eq.
A.28). The variation of households’ net worth obviously depends on the difference between net-income,
as defined above, and consumption. However, since the definition of net income given above includes
a the flow of dividends paid at the end of the previous period (thus already increasing households’ net
worth), while neglecting current period dividends, we respectively subtract and add them in the equation
to get the right dynamics for households’ net worth (eq. A.29). Households’ net wealth takes the form
of banks’ deposits (eq. A.30).
Ntot = Nc +Nk +Ng (A.23)
NIh = (WNtot +
idDh
1 + gSS
+
Divc +Divk +Divb
1 + gSS
)(1− τh)− ωW (sizeΦH −Ntot) (A.24)
Th = (WNtot +
idDh
1 + gSS
+ (
Divc +Divk +Divb
1 + gSS
)τh (A.25)
ch = α1
NIh
pc
+ α2
NWh
(1 + gss)pc
(A.26)
ch = yc (A.27)
Ch = chpc (A.28)
NWh(
gSS
1 + gSS
) = NIh −Ch −
(Divc +Divk +Divb)
1 + gSS
+ (Divc +Divk +Divb) (A.29)
NWh = Dh (A.30)
Profits by banks are the sum of interests on the previous period outstanding stock of loans, plus
interests paid by the government on the stock of bonds held by banks, minus interests paid on deposits
of households and firms (eq. A.22). 48 Banks pay taxes (eq. A.32) and distribute a share of net-profits
to households (eq. A.33). Banks’ net worth is defined as the difference between assets, that is loans,
bonds, and reserves, and liabilities, which are represented by customers’ deposits (eq. A.34). Given
the structure of the economy banks reserves (eq. A.35) are exactly equal to central bank’s holdings of
government bonds (see the Balance Sheet Matrix of the economy presented in the appendix A), which
are defined as the a residual (eq. A.36).
The variation of government debt is given by the difference between government outlays for wages
of public servants, unemployment benefits and interests on past period public debt, and government
revenues from taxes and central bank’s profits (eq. A.37). This latter are just represented by interest on
bonds held by the central bank, which are promptly returned to the government (eq. A.38).
48We assume cash advances by the CB to be equal to zero as banks’ in the SS have enough liquidity to satisfy the
mandatory liquidity ratio.
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pib = i
lLc + Lk
1 + gSS
+ ib
Bb
1 + gSS
− id
Dh +Dc +Dk
1 + gSS
(A.31)
Tb = pibτb (A.32)
Divb = ρb [pib(1− τb)] (A.33)
NWb = Lc + Lk +Bb +Rb −Dh −Dc −Dk (A.34)
Rb = BCB (A.35)
BCB = B−Bb (A.36)
B(
gSS
1 + gSS
) = WNg + ωW (sizeΦH −Ntot) +
ibB
1 + gSS
− (Th +Tb + Tc + Tk)− piCB (A.37)
piCB =
ibBCB
1 + gSS
(A.38)
A.4 Exogenous variables set-up
The last block is characterized by sixteen equations and eighteen unknowns. We close the system by
adding two further equations. Equation A.39 states that in the SS the unemployment rate is equal to
u = 0.08. Equation A.40 is to ensure that the banking sector has a reasonable level of net worth in the
SS, thereby assuming that this is equal to a share β = 0.08 of its assets:
u =
sizeΦH −Ntot
Ntot
(A.39)
NWb = β(Lc + Lk +Bb +Rb) (A.40)
In order to find a numerical solution for the steady state we have to set exogenously the values of
some variables. First we set the desired rate of inflation gSS to 0.0075. The population of households is
composed of 8000 agents. Given that the number of capital firms is 1/5 of the number of consumption
firms we set the number of workers initially employed in capital and consumption sectors to 1000 and
5000 respectively, so that each firm, regardless its type, starts with 25 employees. We further assume an
unemployment rate of u = 8% and we set wages W = 5.
We then set the SS amount of capital goods k = 40000 and we set for simplicity their productivity
to 1 and their duration κ = 20. Since we want to start with a reasonable rate of capacity utilization by
consumption firms we set the SS value of u = 0.8.
Both types of firms holds an amount of inventories equal to a share ν = 0.1 of real sales.
We set the markup for capital firms equal to 0.075. Since consumption firms have to invest in capital
goods their markup over variable unit costs should be higher than capital firms’. We set muc = 0.319
which corresponds to a mark up over total unit costs (including capital amortization costs) of 0.1, in
order to characterize consumption firms’ with an adequate margin of profits in the initial period of the
simulation.
We assume the rate of taxation to be equal across sectors τh = τb = τc = τk = 0.18.
Consumption and capital firms distribute a share equal to ρc = ρk = 0.9 of their after tax profits to
households, while dividends for banks are a share ρb = 0.6 of net profits. Both types of firms hold a share
σ = 1 of their past period expenditure on wages for precautionary reasons.
Firms’ pay an interest il = 0.0075 to banks. The interest rate on deposits id is set to 0.0025. The
interest rate on bonds ib is set equal to 0.0025 as well.
Having specified this exogenous values, the SS system of equation can be solved numerically in order to
obtain the initial values for stocks and flows displayed in the accounting matrices presented in Appendix
A.
Real and financial stocks are then distributed uniformly across agents within each sector. For real
capital, deposits, inventories, bonds and reserves - which have either a 1-period or indefinite duration -
this can be done by simply divide the aggregate stock value for the number of agents in the sector.
The procedure is relatively more complicated for loans and capital goods, which are subjected to a
financial amortization schedule over η and κ periods, respectively.
As explained in section 4 the outstanding values of the collection of heterogeneous loans that firms
hold in their balance sheet have to sum up to Lc. Similarly the nominal values of the different batches
of capital goods held by consumption firms have to sum up to Kc.
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In order to characterize each stock of loans, we first distribute loans uniformly across firms within
each sector and indicate by LTotx =
Lx
sizeΦk
the total debt level of the individual firm x. Then, knowing
the steady state rate of inflation gSS , and the loan repayment schedule, we solve the following system of
equations to compute the outstanding value Lj of each loan granted in period −j for an original amount
L∗xj.
L∗xj = L
∗
x,j−1(1 + gss) & Lxj = L
∗
xj
η − j
η
& LTotx =
η−1∑
i=0
Lxj (A.41)
More precisely, Lx0 (i.e. the value of the loan granted in period 0 to firm x), will be given by:
Lx0 =
LTotx∑η−1
j=0 (
η−j
η
1
(1+gr)j
(A.42)
We can then compute L∗xj = Lx0/(1 + gr)
j for each loan indexed by j = 0, η − 1. Finally, we use
Lxj = L
∗
xj
η−j
η
to compute their outstanding values, as recorded in the begin-of-simulation-period firm’s
balance sheet.
Similarly, knowing the nominal value of consumption firms’ capital stock, the inflation rate gSS , and
the amortization schedule, we derive the nominal value for each capital batch owned by consumption
firms’ as:
Kj =
pk
(1 + gss)j
k
κ− j
κ
, (A.43)
The above procedure allows to characterize firms’ initial balance sheets. Indirectly, it also allows to
characterize the balance sheets of banks since every single loan recorded on the liability side of a firm’s
balance sheet is also recorded on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet. This credit relations linking
firms to banks and vice-versa are drawn randomly, although we distribute them in a way such that each
bank has the same number of loans, for a same amount, and with similar maturities, with the same
number of customers.
The numerical solution of the steady state also provides the values for some parameters of the model,
namely α1, the propensity to consume out of income, νN , the productivity of labor in the capital sector.
The SS-values are also employed to set the values of other behavioral parameters which do not directly
enter in the system of equation describing the SS: u¯, r¯ the target capacity utilization and profits rates in
consumption firms’ investment function and CRT0 , LR
T
0 , banks’ initial target capital and liquidity ratios,
are set equal to their correspondent values in the SS:
u¯ = 0.8 (A.44)
r¯ =
OCFc
Kc
(A.45)
OCFc = πc(1− τc) +
pkk
κ2
j=1∑
κ
1
(1 + gSS)j
− invc
gSS
1 + gSS
ucc − L0c
1
η
η∑
j=1
1
(1 + gSS)j
(A.46)
CRT0 =
NWb
Lc + Lk
, LRT0 (A.47)
LRT0 =
Rb
Dh +Dc +Dk
(A.48)
where the operating cash flows can be derived from net-profits by adding amortization costs and
subtracting the nominal variation of inventories and principal repayment over previous debt (eq. A.46).
Banks’ risk aversion parameters ςk and ςc were computed in order to have a single-period probability
of default prD = 1%, at the steady state levels of operating cash flow and debt service costs.49 Solving
for ς equation 3.13, we obtain:
ςk =
OCFk
L0kil +
L0k
η
− ln(
1
prD
− 1) (A.49)
ςc =
OCFc
L0cil +
L0c
η
− ln(
1
prD
− 1) (A.50)
49Notice that this value represents the borrower’s probability of default estimated by banks for each period from when
the loan is granted to its complete repayment. The estimated overall probability of having a default before the loan is
repaid is higher.
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where OCFk = πk(1− τk)− invk
gSS
1+gSS
uck − L00k
1
η
∑η
j=1
1
(1+gSS)j
.
Remaining free parameters of the model were set as follows: The γ1 γ2, the profit and capacity
utilization rates weights, were set respectively equal to 0.01 and 0.02. ǫd = ǫl and ǫc = ǫk, the parameters
affecting the probability of switching to a new supplier, were set so that a 15% and 20% difference between
the prices of the old and new suppliers gives a probability of 50% to switch. The parameters of the Folded
Normal Distribution used in the prices, wages, and interest adaptive strategies, (µFN , σ
2
FN ), were set so
that the expected value of a sample is 0.0075. Finally, the number of potential partners on consumption
and capital good markets χc, χk were both set equal to 5, The number of potential partners on deposit
and credit markets χd, χl were set equal to 3, and the numer of potential partners on the labor market
chin was set equal to 10.
B Parameters values and Initial Setup
Households Cons. Firms Cap. Firms Banks Govt. Central Bank Total
Deposits +80704.1 +25000 +5000 −110704 0 0 0
Loans 0 −52194.4 −1298 +53492.5 0 0 0
Cons. Goods 0 +2997.4 0 0 0 0 +2997.4
Cap. Goods 0 +53863.6 +500 0 0 0 +54363.6
Bonds 0 0 0 +38273.5 −66838.1 +28564.6 0
Reserves 0 0 0 +28564.6 0 −28564.6 0
Advances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Worth +80704.1 +29666.6 +4202 +9626.4 −66838.1 0 +57361
Table 1: Aggregate Balance Sheet (Initial Situation)
Households Cons. Firms Cap. Firms Banks Govt. Central Bank Σ
CA KA CA KA CA KA CA KA
Consumption −32971.4 +32971.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wages +36800 −25000 0 −5000 0 0 0 −6800 0 0 0
Dole +1280 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1280 0 0 0
CG on inventories 0 +22.3 −22.3 +3.7 −3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 0 0 −5375 +5375 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital Amortization 0 −4974 +4974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taxes −7084.7 −484.8 0 −68.7 0 −39.3 0 +7677.4 0 0 0
Dep. Interest +200.3 +62 0 +12.4 0 −274.7 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds Interest 0 0 0 0 0 +95 0 −165.9 +70.9 0 0
Loans Interest 0 −388.5 0 −9.7 0 +398.2 0 0 0 0 0
Advances Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profits +2367.6 −2208.4 +220.8 −312.8 +31.3 −179.1 +71.7 0 0 0 0
CB profits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +70.9 −70.9 0 0
∆ Deposits −600.8 0 −186.1 0 −37.2 0 +824.1 0 0 0 0
∆ Advances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
∆ Reserves 0 0 0 0 0 0 −212.6 0 0 +212.6 0
∆ Gov. Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 −284.9 +497.6 0 −212.6 0
∆ Loans 0 0 +388.5 0 +9.7 0 −398.2 0 0 0 0
∆ Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Aggregate Transaction Flow Matrix (Initial Situation)
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Table 3: Parameters
Symbol Description Baseline Sensitivity
gSS: pre-SS Nominal rate of growth in the SS 0.0075 same
sizeΦH : pre-SS Number of households 8000 same
sizeΦC : pre-SS Number of consumption firms 100 same
sizeΦK : pre-SS Number of capital firms 20 same
sizeΦB : pre-SS Number of banks 10 same
Ngt: SS-given Number of public servants (constant) 1360 same
Nc0: pre-SS Consumption firms’ initial workers 4000 same
Nk0: pre-SS Capital firms’ initial workers 1000 same
u0: pre-SS Initial unemployment 0.08 same
µN : SS-given Productivity of labor in K sector 2 same
{µk, lk}: pre-SS and
SS-given
Productivity and capital/labor ratios of K {1, 6.4} same
χc = χk: free Number of potential partners on C and K
goods mkts
5 same
χd = χl: free Number of potential partners on deposit-credit
mkts
3 same
χn: free Number of potential partners on labor mkt (for
each vacant job)
10 same
ǫd = ǫl: free Intensity of choice in deposit-credit mkts 4.62098 same
ǫc = ǫk: free Intensity of choice in C and K goods mkts 3.46574 same
ν: pre-SS Firms’ inventories target share 0.1 same
λ: free Adaptive expectations parameter 0.25 same
ϑ: free Labor turnover ratio 0.05 same
µc0: pre-SS Initial mark-up on ULC for C firms 0.318857 same
µk0: pre-SS Initial mark-up on ULC for K firms 0.075 same
(µFN , σ
2
FN
): free Folded Normal Distribution parameters (1,0.0094) same
τpi = τi: pre-SS Profit and Income tax rates 0.18 same
η: pre-SS Loans duration 20 same
κ: pre-SS Capital goods duration 20 same
r: SS-given Target profit rate (Investment function) 0.04345 same
u: SS-given Target capacity utilization (Investment func-
tion)
0.8 same
γ1: free Profit rate weight (Investment function) 0.01 0.000 : 0.005 : 0.040
γ2: free Capacity utilization rate weight (Investment
function)
0.02 0.000 : 0.005 : 0.040
σ: pre-SS Firms’ precautionary deposits as share of WB 1 0.5 : 0.1 : 1.5
ρc = ρk: pre-SS Firms’ profits’ share distributed as dividends 0.9 same
ρb: pre-SS: Banks’ profit share distributed as dividends 0.6 same
il
b0
: pre-SS Initial interest rate on loans 0.0075 same
id
b0
: pre-SS Initial interest rate on deposits 0.0025 same
CRT
0
: SS-given Initial banks’ target capital ratio 0.17996 same
LRT
0
: SS-given Initial banks’ target liquidity ratio 0.258026342 same
ςc: free Banks’ risk aversion towards C firms 3.92245 1.0 : 1.0 : 10.0
ςk: free Banks’ risk aversion towards K firms 21.51335 5.0 : 5.0 : 40.0
i
a
cb: pre-SS CB interest rates on advances 0.005 same
ι: free Haircut on defaulted firms’ capital value 0.5 same
wn0: pre-SS Initial wages 5 same
ω: pre-SS Dole (share of average wages) 0.4 same
υ: free Unemployment threshold in wage revision
function
0.08 same
α1: SS-given Propensity to consume out of income 0.38581 same
α2: pre-SS Propensity to consume out of wealth 0.25 same
i
b
: pre-SS Bonds interest rate 0.0025 same
pb: pre-SS Bonds price 1 same
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